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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of alternative teacher 
compensation programs (ACPs) on teacher retention rates and average student 
achievement in schools. ACPs base teacher pay mainly on some measure of their 
performance, such as student achievement, leadership, professional knowledge and skills, 
and instructional behavior. This study used the Minnesota Quality Compensation 
program (Q Comp) case to examine the effect of ACPs. 
The relationships between ACPs and 3 types of school-level outcomes were 
explored: overall teacher retention rate, retention rate of teachers with three or more years 
of teaching experience, and rate of students who were at or above the proficiency level 
(student proficiency rate). In addition, it was also examined whether ACPs’ effects on 
those three school-level outcomes differed by type of school, charter or traditional. 
This study investigated teacher retention rates and student proficiency rates in 
Minnesota public schools over 8 years, 2003-2010. Because Q Comp began from the 
2005-06 school year, the research period makes it possible to examine the effect of Q 
Comp implementation for up to 5 years, which was a long investigation relative to 
previous studies. Data on assignment of Minnesota public schools teachers developed by 
the Minnesota Department of Education and publicly posted on the Pioneer Press website 
were used to calculate teacher retention rate by school level. The school-level student 
proficiency rate for the third-grade mathematics and reading tests of the Minnesota 
Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) was used to measure school-level student 
achievement. To minimize selection bias problem, this study adopted a fixed effects 
v 
model to control for unobserved time-invariant variables across schools as well as to 
consider time-variant observable variables. 
This study found a positive effect of Q Comp on overall teacher retention rate 
only in schools with 5 years of implementation. In addition this positive effect, charter 
schools with 5 years of Q Comp implementation faced a negative effect of Q Comp on 
overall teacher retention rate. A positive effect of Q Comp on retention rate of teachers 
with 3 or more years of teaching experience was also found only in schools with 5 years 
of implementation. Regarding the effect of Q Comp on student achievement, this study 
did not find any significant overall effect on schools. Charter schools with 3 years of Q 
Comp, however, enjoyed a positive and significant effect on the third-grade math 
proficiency rate. 
The findings of this study imply that it takes ACPs some time to realize their 
effect. It took about 5 years of implementation in the case of Minnesota Q Comp for there 
to be an effect on teacher retention rate, which is a contribution of this study. Another 
contribution of this study is the finding that the effect of ACPs could differ by school 
type. The findings could lead to further discussion on whether the effect of ACPs could 
be sustainable and whether the positive effect on teacher retention rate would lead to 
improvement in student achievement, which remain considerations for future studies. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In this accountability era, there have been increasing concerns and various efforts 
to improve school performance by focusing on student achievement.  Given the 
considerable size of teachers’ contributions to student achievement, much of this effort 
on the part of policymakers have focused on teachers (Archibald, 2006; Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1999). An increasingly popular strategy has been an attempt to align teacher 
compensation with teacher performance to motivate teachers to perform better (Odden & 
Kelley, 2002). This study proposes to examine the effect of an alternative teacher 
compensation program implemented in public schools in Minnesota. 
Background of this Study 
The relatively mediocre achievement of American students compared to those of 
other countries has been a serious concern for many US policymakers. According to 
results of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA; Fleischman, Hopstock, Pelczar, & 
Shelley, 2010), for example, 15-year-old American students showed an average score of 
487 on the 2009 PISA mathematics literacy scale. This score was lower than the OECD 
average score of 496 for this cohort. In the science literacy scale of the 2009 PISA, the 
average score of American students, 502, was similar to the OECD average level, 501. 
These low scores were not a new trend. The average U.S. mathematics scores on the 
previous PISA tests were 483 in 2003 and 474 in 2006, and the 2009 PISA mathematics 
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score of 487 showed no improvement over the course of six years. This ordinary or lower 
achievement level has been pointed out as problematic and characterized as a symptom of 
the decline in U.S. competency (e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
1983). That problem definition leads us to a question about the factors that can influence 
the improvement of student achievement. 
Student Achievement and Characteristics of Teachers 
Studies on the factors related to student achievement have found that students’ 
achievement varies by students’ individual characteristics, family backgrounds, and 
school characteristics. For example, Goldhaber and Brewer (1999) disaggregated the 
variance in student achievement using a three-way nested-error model. They found that 
8.52% of the variance in student achievement was related to the teacher level, 8.62% of 
the variance was related to the school level, 4.12% of the variance was related to the class 
level, and the other variance was due to the individual and family levels (Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1999, p. 207). This finding suggests that about 21% of the variance in test scores 
among students were related to the differences in their schools, classes, and teachers. 
Also, about one-third of the school-related variance was associated with teachers (8.52% 
over 21%).  
In another study that examined the effect of school resources on student 
achievement, Archibald (2006) also disaggregated the variance of student achievement 
into student level, class level, and school level by applying a hierarchical linear model 
(HLM). She reported that about 82% of the variations in reading scores were at the 
student level, 4% were at the class level, and 16% were at the school level. For math 
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scores, about 74%, 8%, and 19% were at the student, class, and school level, respectively 
(Archibald, 2006, p. 33). The finding showed that about 20% of variance in reading 
scores and 27% in math scores were associated with school-related resources. Among the 
school-related variance,  about one-fifth (4% over 20% in reading) to one-fourth (8% 
over 27% in math) of the school-related variance were associated with classes or teachers.  
From the two studies, we found that at least 20% of the variance in student 
achievement was related to school characteristics. This degree of influence is smaller 
than the remaining factors from individual and family backgrounds, which accounts for 
about 80% of the variance. However, policymakers typically can exert greater control 
over school characteristics, including class and teacher characteristics, than individual 
and family attributes. Consequently, it is important to understand which characteristics of 
schools are related to student achievement.  
As a school resource associated with student achievement, teachers are important. 
As seen in the two studies above, teacher-related variance accounted for one-fifth to one-
third of the school characteristics associated with student achievement. Moreover, as 
Odden and Kelley (2002) argued, executing various efforts to improve schools, including 
rigorous curriculum standards (Alexander, 2003), class size(Finn & Achilles, 1999), or 
amount of financial expenditure (Odden & Picus, 2008), depends mainly on teachers. 
This argument also supports the importance of teachers as a school resource related to 
student achievement. The conclusion that teachers matter in improving student 
achievement leads to a question of how to improve teaching as it relates to student 
achievement.  
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Motivation, Professional Development, and Compensation 
One way to improve teaching is to reform the teacher compensation policy (e.g., 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). This approach is from an 
assumption that the existing single–salary schedule would not motivate teachers to give 
their best performance (Lazear, 2003; Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
In 1921, the single–salary schedule was first introduced in the U.S. in the Denver 
and Des Moines school systems (Sharpes, 1987). Under the single–salary schedule,  
teachers received different compensation according to their teaching experience and 
levels of academic preparation (Odden & Kelley, 2002). This system of compensation 
was considered to be fairer than the one it replaced because it compensated all teachers in 
the district on the same scale regardless of gender, race, grade level taught, or family 
status of the teacher (Educational Research Service, 1978, in Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
In spite of its potential advantage in compensating teachers equitably, critics have 
pointed out that the single–salary schedule “[deprived] public school managers of 
authority to adjust an individual teacher’s pay to reflect both performance and labor 
market realities” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007, p. 912). Opponents of the single–salary 
schedule argued that it could result in teachers not being motivated to improve the 
professional knowledge and skills associated with student achievement (Odden & Kelley, 
2002). Critics called for alternative compensation programs (ACPs) in which teacher 
compensation is strategically connected with the development of professional knowledge 
and skills and student achievement. With alternative compensation aligning 
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compensation with performance, teachers are expected to be more motivated and 
proactive to improve their capacities related to student achievement. 
Alternative Compensation Programs 
This study used the term ACPs differently from “performance-related pay” or 
“performance pay.” Some researchers used those terms to indicate compensation 
programs that reward teachers based only on their performance as measured by student 
achievement (e.g., Podgursky & Springer, 2007). The present study called those narrowly 
defined types of compensation “merit pay programs,” and they are reviewed in the next 
chapter as a sub-component of ACPs.  
This study used the term ACPs to refer to those programs that typically 
compensate broad- based teacher performance, not just performance based on student 
achievement. That is, as used here, ACPs also compensate other performances of 
teachers, including career advancement, professional development, and the results of 
teacher evaluation (Azordegan, Byrnett, Campbell, Greenman, & Coulter, 2005; 
Brodsky, DeCesare, & Kramer-Wine, 2010). ACPs in this study encompass all of those 
elements, direct and indirect, associated with improving student achievement. 
It is not difficult to find examples of ACPs. They include the Teacher 
Advancement Program of the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching, Professional 
Compensation System for Teachers of Denver in Colorado, and Minnesota Quality 
Compensation Program (Azordegan et al., 2005; Odden & Kelley, 2002). The U.S. 
federal government also increased their effort to support these alternatives through the 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) Program. For example, the appropriated funding of the TIF 
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program started at $99 million in 2006 and increased to $400 million in 2010, a nominal 
increase of just over 300 percent in under 5 years (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
Purpose and Organization of this Study  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of an alternative teacher 
compensation program.  Although there has been increased interest in adopting and 
implementing ACPs, there have been few studies examining their effect. According to 
Podgursky and Springer’s (2007) review, there have been few rigorous experimental or 
quasi-experimental studies on the effect on student achievement of ACPs implemented 
within U.S. schools. While some institutes have recently published empirical studies, few 
studies were found in peer-reviewed journals. 
Chapter II begins with a review of the literature on the relationship between 
student achievement, teachers’ teaching experience, and teachers’ graduate degrees. 
Teaching experience and education were examined closely because these factors drive 
compensation for the existing single–salary schedule. The weak associations of these 
factors with student achievement have been at the center of  the critique against the single
–salary schedule (Goldhaber, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). I also reviewed the scholarship on the underlying theory and practice associated 
with alternate compensation programs. Based on this review, Chapter II explores the 
theory of logic underlying ACPs and presents my assessment of studies examining the 
effect of ACPs. The chapter closes with a discussion of the gaps in the literature and key 
research questions that emerge. 
   7 
Chapter III outlines the research design and data sources used in this study. This 
chapter briefly introduced the Minnesota Quality Compensation Program (Q Comp), an 
ACP case that this study selected as an object of analysis. This is a good program to 
explore the impact of ACPs because its initial implementation in 2005 provides a long 
enough history where its effects may be analyzed. This is an advantage over other studies 
where the long-term impact of ACPs was not fully explored because of their relative 
novelty. The chapter continues with a description of the conceptual frameworks 
employed to analyze teacher retention rate and student achievement, which the theory of 
logic indicates would improve with implementation of ACPs. Chapter III also includes a 
description of the variables and equations used in analyzing the impact of ACPs. 
Chapters IV and V provide the results of the analyses and discuss the estimates of 
the coefficients derived from the equations described in Chapter III. Chapter IV presents 
the results of the teacher retention rate model, and the results of the analyses of the 
student achievement model are presented in Chapter V.  
Finally, Chapter VI concludes with a summation of the results and discusses the 
implications of the findings. It also indicates the limitations of this study and offers 
guidelines for future research. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Teaching Experience, Graduate Degrees, and Student Achievement 
Alternative compensation programs for teachers have developed from an 
assumption that the existing single–salary schedule has limitations in motivating teachers 
to improve their performances (Odden & Kelley, 2002). Single–salary schedules mainly 
depend on years of teaching experience and graduate degrees to increase the amount of 
compensation given to teachers. Critics, however, have been concerned that those 
characteristics are not necessarily associated with student achievement, an important 
indication of the performance of teachers (e.g., Hanushek, 1989). If their concerns are 
valid, under the single–salary schedule, teachers may be compensated regardless of how 
well their students perform. As a result, opponents of a single–salary schedule for 
teachers argue that the existing compensation programs fail to motivate teachers to focus 
on student achievement. This chapter begins with a review of the studies examining the 
role of teacher attributes on student achievement. 
Teaching Experience  
As Lortie (1975, p. 60) metaphorically expressed, teachers “sink or swim” in the 
classroom and develop much of their professional abilities through their experiences. 
Many studies using education production functions have supported the notion that 
teachers with more teaching experience show greater effects on student achievement. For 
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example, Ferguson (1991) divided teaching experience in school districts into three 
categories: the percentage of teachers with fewer than five years of experience, those with 
five to nine years of experience and those with more than nine years of experience. He 
compared the relationship among the various years of teaching experience with the 
district’s average reading scores. In the analysis, he found that student reading scores 
increased significantly when the percentage of teachers with five to nine years of 
experience replaced the percentage of teachers with fewer than five years of experience. 
Replacing teachers with fewer than five years of experience with teachers having more 
than nine years of experience was also related to an increase in the standardized 
achievement scores. From the result, we can see the positive effect of teaching experience 
on student achievement. 
An important question regarding the relationship between experience and student 
performance is whether the association is linear. Considering Ferguson’s (1991) study, he 
found that “in the primary grades, … once teachers have five years of experience, 
additional years do not add to their effectiveness” (Ferguson, 1991, p. 476). For example, 
in the third grade reading scores, the difference in teacher quality between teachers with 
zero to five years of experience and teachers with five to nine years of experience was 
0.022 (t =3.70, Ferguson, 1991, p. 493). On the other hand, the difference between 
teachers with zero to five years of experience and teachers with more than nine years of 
experience is 0.016 (t = 4.51, Ferguson, 1991, p. 493). It was smaller than the previous 
group difference, which implied that the effect of teachers with five to nine years of 
experience would not be bigger than the effect of teachers with more than nine years of 
experience.  
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Whereas Ferguson’s (1991) study showed the decreasing coefficient of teaching 
experience, he said little about the differences within the first five years of experience. 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) looked specifically at the association between the 
first five years of teaching and student achievement. They used math and reading test 
scores of third to seventh graders in Texas public schools from 1993 to 98. They included 
four categorical variables to measure teaching experience: teachers with less than one 
year of experience, teachers with one year of experience, teachers with two years of 
experience, and teachers with three or four years of experience. The omitted category was 
for teachers with five or more years of teaching experience. By using this strategy, the 
authors were able to compare more experienced teachers with less experienced teachers.  
In the study, Rivkin et al. (2005) found “important gains in teaching quality in the first 
year of experience … [but] little evidence that improvements continue after the first three 
years” (Rivkin et al., 2005, p. 449). This finding indicated a more limited effect of 
teaching experience than Ferguson’s (1991) study.  
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor  (2006) examined the effect of teaching experience 
for elementary teachers divided into six categories of years of teaching experience: 1 to 2, 
3 to 5, 6 to 12, 13 to 20, 21 to 27, and more than 27 years. In this study, the effect of each 
category was compared to the effect of zero-experienced teachers. They used fifth 
graders’ math and reading scores in North Carolina public schools in the 2000–2001 
school year as their dependent variable. They found that all experienced teacher groups 
were more effective than the new teacher group in student achievement gain and the 
maximum effectiveness was shown in the more than 27 years of experience group. They 
specified, however, that “roughly half of this return occurs for the first one or two years 
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of teaching experience” (Clotfelter et al., 2006, p. 807). This is similar to Rivkin et al.’s 
(2005) study in terms of the large growth in the first few years of experience and smaller 
gains later.   
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2010) also examined the effect of teaching 
experience of high school teachers. They looked at the exam scores of 10
th
 graders in 
North Carolina public schools from the 1999–2000 to 2002–2003 school years. They 
included the same teaching experience categories as Clotfelter et al. (2006) and reached a 
similar conclusion. They reported that all experienced teacher groups were more effective 
than new teachers, and the maximum effect appeared in teachers with 21 to 27 years of 
experience (β=0.0629, s.e.=0.005 in Clotfelter et al., 2010, p. 665). Moreover, similar to 
the previous studies, the marginal improvement in student achievement attributed to 
teachers mostly appeared within the first two years of teaching. The effect of teachers 
with three to five years of experience compared to teachers with no experience was 
0.0608 (β=0.0608, s.e.=0.005 in Clotfelter et al., 2010, p. 665). The effect, 0.0608, was 
not significantly different from the effect of teachers with 21–27 years of experience, the 
maximum effect (Clotfelter et al., 2010, p. 666). 
As shown, Rivkin et al.’s (2005) study argued that teachers with fewer than three 
years of experience have been observed to be less effective in improving student test 
scores than teachers with three or more years of experience. And Clotfelter et al.’s (2006, 
2010) studies did not have results largely different from Rivkin and her colleagues. 
Findings, however, were mixed on the issue of whether or not teachers would 
consistently increase their effectiveness with more than three years of teaching 
experience.  
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Graduate Degrees 
We can expect that graduate degree courses will improve teachers’ knowledge, 
skills, and disposition, and thereby teacher quality. However, empirical studies are less 
supportive of the assumption that teachers with graduate degrees influence student 
achievement more than teachers without. For example, Ferguson (1991) found that the 
percentage of teachers with graduate degrees in school districts was not significantly 
associated with students’ reading test scores. Alexander (1998) also found that there was 
no significant association between the graduate degrees that teachers held and student 
achievement. 
More recent studies show consistent results with Ferguson (1991) and Alexander 
(1998). Rivkin et al.’s (2005) study with fourth to seventh graders’ math and reading data 
reported that the proportion of teachers with graduate degrees was not related to gains in 
students’ test scores (β= -0.018, s.e.=0.017). Clotfelter et al.’s (2010) study of high 
school data also reported a statistically insignificant effect concerning teachers’ graduate 
degrees (β=0.0024, s.e.=0.002). Moreover, Clotfelter et al.’s (2006) study of elementary 
school data found that teachers with graduate degrees were significantly less effective 
than those without graduate degrees (Clotfelter et al., 2006, p. 798).  
Given the insignificant or negative effect of graduate degrees, it is difficult to say 
that graduate degrees can reflect the quality of teachers despite theoretical assumptions. 
The results could be caused by some methodological issues. First of all, teachers with 
graduate degrees are likely to have more teaching experience, as Clotfelter et al. (2006) 
indicated for their dataset. This means that there is the possibility of multicollinearity 
when graduate degrees are included in regression models with teaching experience. A 
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multicollinearity problem could potentially increase the standard error of the coefficients 
in the regression models. As a result, the tendency of rejecting the hypothesis of the t-test 
for the βs would decrease (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008). It could explain why some 
empirical studies found no significant effect of graduate degrees. However, it is still hard 
to explain their negative effect.  
Second, and more important, the studies listed above do not identify the fields of 
study that the graduate degrees represent. For example, when teachers earn a graduate 
degree in educational administration, it may be less reasonable to expect these teachers to 
increase the math scores of their students than to expect teachers with graduate degrees in 
math education to do so.  
Third, the insignificant results may be attributed to the efforts of teachers’ 
colleges and states to improve initial licensure programs and intensify state licensure 
requirements. The efforts could improve the quality of initial licensed teachers (Darling-
Hammond, 2000). Those efforts could reduce the difference in quality between teachers 
with and without graduate degrees. 
We need to be cautious in drawing conclusions on the effects of graduate degrees. 
Thus, we cannot conclude, based on the existing research, that graduate degrees in and of 
themselves are significantly associated with higher student achievement.  
Development of Alternative Teacher Compensation 
Even though more research would be helpful, the present status of the scholarship 
indicates that teaching experiences and graduate degrees seem to be weakly associated 
with student achievement. Consequently, teachers with characteristics associated with 
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higher student achievement would not necessarily be rewarded under compensation 
programs based on those characteristics. This leads to concerns that there would be little 
motivation for teachers to improve their ability as related to increases in student 
achievement under current single-salary compensation programs, which are based on 
years of experience and education (Lazear, 2003; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007). Alternative policy ideas to address these concerns, therefore, are 
focusing on “paying for outcomes” to align compensation with performance. 
Merit Pay Program 
Merit pay is “a generic term for any device that adjusts salaries or provides 
compensation to reward higher levels of performance” (Ellis, 1984, p. 2). The level of 
performance is usually determined by a supervisor or by peer review (Odden & Kelley, 
2002). The merit pay program is devised to motivate teachers to perform better largely 
based on expectancy theory (Hasnain & Pierskalla Henryk, 2012; Odden & Kelley, 
2002). 
The expectancy theory proposed by Vroom (1964) and Porter and Lawler (1968) 
hypothesizes that the level of force that an employee exerts to get a performance would 
be a function of expectancy and valence for the performance (Heneman & Schwab, 
1972). Here, the expectancy is the perceived probability that a certain level of effort will 
result in the achievement of each performance level, and the valence refers to “the 
strength of the [employee]’s desire for an outcome” (Lewin, 1938 in Galbraith & 
Cummings, 1967, p. 239). The valence for the performance (the first-level outcome) is 
determined by all events which are affected by the performance (the second-level 
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outcome) and the instrumentality, “the perception of the relationship between the first 
and the second level outcome” (Galbraith & Cummings, 1967, p. 239).  
This implies that by guaranteeing merit pay for an increased level of performance, 
school leaders can affect the valence for the increased performance of teachers and can 
increase the teachers’ effort to get that increased performance. The premise is that 
teachers should believe that they have the ability to get the increased level of 
performance, and their increased efforts will lead to the level of performance sought. 
Besides the motivation effect of the merit pay program, Lazear (2003) argued that 
a teacher sorting effect could be expected from merit pay programs. Merit pay programs 
based on teacher performance will pay more to teachers evaluated as showing high 
performance and will pay less to teachers who are lowly evaluated. Assuming that 
teachers with higher compensation are more likely to stay in their schools (Clotfelter, 
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2011; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004), merit pay program will attract 
and retain more highly rated teachers and fewer lowly rated teachers. As a result, Lazear 
(2003) argued that this sorting process will result in improving teaching in the schools. 
In spite of theoretical expectations on motivation or sorting, there have been 
critiques against introducing it in the teaching profession. An important critique is that 
external motivation would be effective for simple tasks but not effective for complex and 
ambiguous tasks (Austin, 1996 as cited in Osterloh & Frey, 2002). Considering that 
teaching has been known to incorporate complex and ambiguous tasks (Weick, 1976), 
balancing external and internal motivations would be important for effective motivation, 
as Osterloh and Frey (2002) argued. 
In addition, investigating successful and failed merit pay programs in schools, 
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Murnane and Cohen (1986, p. 7) found that the school leaders adapting the merit pay 
programs faced difficulties in answering “why does worker X get merit pay and I don’t?” 
and “what can I do to get merit pay?” They argued that the difficulties resulted from the 
characteristic of the teaching profession, where effective teaching cannot be characterized 
as the consistent use of particular, well-defined techniques. On the other hand, they found 
some successful merit pay programs which worked by modifying key characteristics of 
established merit pay programs. Murnane and Cohen (1986, pp. 12–15) summarized the 
modifying characteristics of the revised programs with four themes: They compensated 
“extra pay for extra work” rather than for better performance in classroom instruction; 
They “[made] everyone feel special” rather than gave differential rewards to make high-
performing teachers feel special; They “[made] merit pay inconspicuous” rather than 
giving information on who get rewards to stimulate better performance; and they 
“[legitimated] through participation” of teacher in designing the program. And as the 
authors mentioned, those themes “changed one or more crucial aspects of the merit pay 
ideas… [thus] economists would not view them as examples of performance-based 
compensation” (Murnane & Cohen, 1986, p. 12).  
Team-Based Merit Pay 
Another critique against merit pay programs is that those programs would cause 
competition among teachers, which hurts teamwork in schools (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). To address this negative effect, some programs were designed to offer merit pay 
based on team, not individual, performance. Odden and Kelley’s (2002) knowledge- and 
skills-based pay program and North Carolina’s ABCs of Public Education (Vigdor, 2008) 
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are examples of programs that offer rewards based on teams rather than individuals. In an 
empirical study of Israeli schools, Lavy (2002) found that school-wide incentive 
programs significantly improved student achievement.  
However, the team merit pay program has a  possibility of a “free rider” problem 
in which some individuals enjoy the outputs produced by the group without increasing 
their own efforts (Lazear, 2003). If free riders were compensated equally with the other 
teachers, it will result in decreases in the other teachers’ motivation and, ultimately, 
overall group performance. Additionally, Lazear (2003) argued that the teacher sorting 
effect would not be expected in the team-based merit pay because free riders or lowly 
rated teachers would receive merit pay based on the team performance.   
Career Ladder System 
The career ladder system appoints better performing teachers in leadership 
positions and rewards them with more pay for their better performance, not only for  
improved student test scores but also for their leadership contributions (Odden & Kelley, 
2002). An important attribute of the career ladder system is to offer professionalism-
focused benefits. Compared to traditional merit pay programs that focus on monetary 
benefits, career ladders seem to address more directly teachers’ resentment, low morale, 
and anti-cooperative behavior (Dee & Keys, 2004). 
The career ladder program is not free from a question of whether the program 
could reward better teachers. Dee and Keys (2004) addressed this question in their study 
of the Tennessee’ Career Ladder Evaluation System in the mid-1980s. They found some 
positive evidence that students of teachers in the upper rung showed better achievement 
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in reading than students of teachers in the lower rung. However, they also found that 
students of teachers in the lower rung showed better achievement in math than students of 
teachers in the upper rung. Because of mixed results across subjects, it is hard to say that 
the career ladder program would identify better teachers to place in the upper rung.   
Knowledge- and Skills-Based Pay Program   
The knowledge- and skills-based pay programs compensate teachers for the 
development of four types of professional knowledge and skill: knowledge and skills in 
(1) classroom instruction, (2) educational functional tasks, (3) school management and 
leadership, and (4) professional activities (Odden & Kelley, 2002). Odden and Kelley 
(2002) criticized the existing single–salary schedule because it increases compensation 
mostly based on indirect indicators of knowledge and skills such as years of teaching 
experience, education units, and university degrees. Therefore, they tried to replace those 
indirect indicators with more direct measures of teacher knowledge and skills. They listed 
various teaching standards developed by various institutes, including the PRAXIS III, the 
Interstate Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (INTASC), the National Board 
for Professional Teaching Standards, and Danielson’s Framework for Teaching. Adapting 
those standards and reflecting local standards of schools and districts, they argued 
schools could build customized developmental stages of teachers’ knowledge and skills. 
They also believe teachers can increase the number of roles they can perform in schools 
with the acquisition of additional expertise. 
Let’s recall the two questions Murnane and Cohen (1986) issued for the merit pay 
program – “why does worker X get merit pay and I don’t?” and “what can I do to get 
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merit pay?”. The knowledge- and skills-based pay programs seem to tell teachers what 
they need to do to achieve high performance by offering developmental stages and 
standards of teachers’ knowledge and skills. Therefore, if the knowledge- and skills-
based pay program could clearly present the standards of each developmental stage and 
how strongly the goals should be associated with students’ achievement, it would 
successfully address Murnane and Cohen’s (1986) questions and achieve higher teacher 
motivation, higher teacher performance, and higher student achievement. 
Alternative Compensation Programs 
Even though this study reviewed some alternative ideas on teacher compensation 
programs, practical alternative programs tend to be designed as a bundle of those 
alternatives reviewed above. For example, the Minnesota Quality Compensation (Q 
Comp) program, which is the focus of the analysis of this study, includes facets of career 
ladder, knowledge- and skills-based pay, and merit pay focusing on student achievement 
(Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, 2009); the Teacher Advancement Program 
of the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching (National Institute for Excellence in 
Teaching, 2012) includes multiple components as well.  
Because of their comprehensiveness, the alternative compensation programs 
(ACPs) do not only focus on teacher performance based on student achievement as do 
some merit pay programs (e.g., Lazear, 2003). They also compensate other performances 
of teachers that reflect advancement in those knowledge and skills of teachers which are 
associated with improvement of school level student achievement as well as 
performances directly measured by student achievement.  
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It is an important characteristic of ACPs to emphasize not only student 
achievement but also the development of knowledge and skills of teachers (e.g., Timar & 
Roza, 2010). This is because focusing on professional development can reduce some of 
the concerns regarding merit pay programs. One important critique is that extrinsic 
motivation, upon which merit pay programs are based, can “crowd out” intrinsic 
motivation (Osterloh & Frey, 2002). According to Osterloh & Frey’s (2002) explanation, 
external rewards have two aspects: controlling and informing. The controlling aspect 
strengthens teachers’ perception of external control while the informing aspect influences 
perceived competence. If the informing aspect is prominent, the external rewards could 
raise intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, in cases where the controlling aspect is 
prominent, teachers no longer feel responsible for goals and values but rather attribute 
responsibility to those who reward their performance. As a result, intrinsic motivation is 
crowded out. Because intrinsic motivation is related not only to the performance being 
rewarded (e.g., academic test scores) but also to any other of a variety of school goals 
(e.g., students’ safety), crowding out intrinsic motivation could lead to a reduction in 
other important aspects of teacher performance (Osterloh & Frey, 2002). Moreover, a 
decrease in intrinsic motivation could be related to a decrease in job satisfaction and an 
increase in teachers’ decision to leave (e.g., Shapira-Lishchinsky, 2012). Considering that 
increases in teachers leaving could negatively influence student achievement (Guin, 
2004), a decrease in intrinsic motivation could offset the expected positive effects of 
merit pay programs on extrinsic motivation and student achievement. Therefore, teacher 
compensation programs need to be designed to motivate teachers intrinsically as well as 
extrinsically. 
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Contrary to simple merit pay programs, Odden and Kelley (2002) argued that 
more comprehensive ACPs could strengthen intrinsic motivation of teachers by offering 
help with professional development, i.e., strengthening the informing aspect of incentives. 
For example, many ACPs create positions for mentors and teacher leaders to help with 
other teachers’ professional development. Teacher evaluations or advanced certifications, 
such as the National Board Certification, give teachers standards for advanced knowledge 
and skills and facilitate them achieving those standards. Through professional 
development, teachers can have control over the quality of their work and create a sense 
of professional efficacy, which is associated with intrinsic motivation. Therefore, Odden 
and Kelley (2002) argued that ACPs can help teachers to be motivated not only 
extrinsically, but also intrinsically, to perform their work better. 
The characteristics of ACPs to motivate teachers intrinsically as well as 
extrinsically could be meaningful in practice. According to interviews with teachers, 
teachers believe that monetary incentives could positively affect professional 
development or instructional practice, which could improve indirectly student 
achievement (Wahlstrom, Sheldon, & Peterson, 2006). On the other hand, teachers were 
reported to have less trust in the direct relationship between monetary incentives and 
student achievement. Based on these findings, monetary incentives would be more likely 
to motivate teachers to improve their instructional practice than they would motivate 
teachers to increase students’ test scores directly. Considering the inducement 
characteristics of ACPs, focusing on professional development as well as student 
achievement in the development of ACPs would be important for effective 
implementation.  
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Expected Effect of Alternative Compensation Programs 
As a compensation program encompassing merit pay and knowledge- and skills-
based pay, ACPs are designed to motivate teachers to develop their knowledge and skills 
to improve student achievement. In addition, teacher retention studies conclude that 
schools’ support for teachers to develop their knowledge and skills can improve the 
schools’ teacher retention rates. Therefore, it is assumed that ACPs will change the 
behaviors of individual teachers and students, which in turn will affect changes in school 
level indicators of teacher retention rates and student achievement. 
ACPs and Teacher Retention 
Teacher retention rate refers here to the percentage of teachers who come back to 
a school in an academic year among the teachers who worked in that school in the 
previous academic year. This study, moreover, restricted the range of teachers to those 
teachers who teach core academic subjects as defined by the Minnesota Department of 
Education.  
Teacher retention rate is an important school characteristic about which school 
policymakers are concerned. This is because schools with low teacher retention rates 
experience difficulty in planning and implementing a coherent curriculum and sustaining 
positive working relationships among teachers (Guin, 2004). The negative impacts of low 
teacher retention rates can hurt teachers’ teamwork and schools’ outcomes (Guin, 2004).  
Losing teachers also generates high costs, including the cost of separation, 
replacement staffing, and training new teachers (Watlington, Shockley, Guglielmino, & 
Felsher, 2010). According to Watlington et al.’s (2010) study, the costs associated with 
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replacing a teacher were calculated to be $4,631 and $12,652 per teacher in two 
Southeast Florida school districts in the 2004–05 academic year. The variation in the cost 
to replace teachers was mainly from the differences in the districts’ induction or 
professional development programs. The costs incurred in replacing teachers can create a 
burden for the school financially. 
Considering the organizational and financial importance of teacher retention rates 
of schools, it is important for school policymakers and school administrators to 
understand factors associated with teacher retention rates and to manage them. Previous 
studies on teacher retention supported the possibility of ACPs improving the teacher 
retention rates of schools. ACPs could support teachers in developing their knowledge 
and skills associated with student achievement (Odden & Kelley, 2002). According to the 
teacher retention literature, opportunities and administrative support for professional 
development are important factors associated with teacher retention (Guarino, 
Santibañez, & Daley, 2006). Because teachers want to develop their knowledge and skills 
in the teaching profession, they prefer schools with working conditions supportive of 
professional development. This preference affects teachers’ decisions to choose the 
schools where they work (Liu, Rosenstein, Swan, & Khalil, 2008). Therefore, schools 
with supportive working conditions for professional development could reduce the 
number of teachers who move to other schools. As a result, they are more likely to have 
higher teacher retention rates. 
Moreover, advanced professional knowledge and skills because of professional 
development efforts are associated with reducing the rate at which teachers leave the 
teaching profession. According to Chapman (1983), advanced professional knowledge 
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and skills reflect advancement in professional integration into teaching. Advanced 
teachers’ integration into teaching increases career satisfaction and positively affects 
teachers’ decisions to stay in the teaching profession. Therefore, schools that develop 
teachers’ professional knowledge and skills can reduce the number of teachers who leave 
the teaching profession. As a result, they are more likely to have higher teacher retention 
rates. A recent empirical study supported the argument that schools that are more 
supportive of professional development are less likely to lose teachers not only to other 
schools, but also to other professions (Boyd et al., 2011). 
In summary, teacher retention studies conclude that schools’ support for teachers 
to develop their knowledge and skills can improve the schools’ teacher retention rates. 
Based on this conclusion, this study hypothesized that well designed ACPs that support 
professional development of teachers can improve the teacher retention rates of schools.  
ACPs and Retention of Experienced Teachers 
This study was also interested in teacher retention rates of teachers with three or 
more years of teaching experience (hereafter, experienced teachers). This matter stemmed 
from concerns that schools must put more effort to retain teachers with characteristics 
that are identified as being associated with higher student achievement (e.g., Boyd, 
Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2009; Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2007). 
Discussion of what characteristics of teachers matter in terms of student achievement is 
not conclusive (Goldhaber, 2008; Strong, 2011). However, at the heart of the discussion, 
there has been consistent support that teachers with three or more years of teaching 
experience would be more effective at improving student achievement than those with 
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zero, one, or two years of teaching experience (e.g., Clotfelter et al., 2006; Rivkin et al., 
2005). Therefore, this study examined the association between ACPs and retention rates 
of experienced teachers.
1
  
Compared to the single–salary schedule, ACPs would not increase teacher salary 
automatically or solely for increases in years of teaching experience. That is, salary 
increases would be linked to improvements in student performance as well as those 
attributes that are traditionally associated with this improvement. Thus, using ACPs, a 
teacher could be compensated for improved student performance, additional years of 
teaching experience, as well as service, professional development, and the knowledge and 
skills related with high performance. If the ACPs are designed to be supportive of 
teachers with many years of teaching experience, their presence would improve the 
retention rates of experienced teachers for those schools. It would be a meaningful 
research topic to examine whether ACPs’ emphasis on the improvement of school 
performance effectively results in the retention of an important resource for schools, 
experienced teachers.  
ACPs and Student Achievement 
Student achievement measured by standardized test scores is an important output 
                                                 
 
1
 Besides experience, teachers identified as Highly Qualified (HQ) as mandated by the No Child Left 
Behind Act (HQ teachers) may also be considered as teachers with important characteristics. While 
meaningful in theory, analyzing the relation between ACPs and retention rates of HQ teachers, however, 
may be meaningless in reality. That is, because of legal requirements, most teachers who teach core 
academic subjects are HQ teachers. For example, Minnesota reported that 97.65% of all core academic 
classes in Minnesota were taught by “highly qualified” teachers in the 2005–06 school year (Minnesota 
Department of Education, 2006a). As a result, the retention rates of HQ teachers are not very different from 
the retention rates of all teachers who teach core academic subjects. As stated previously, this study 
restricts the teacher retention analysis to those teachers of core academic subjects. Therefore, this study 
does not analyze the retention rates of HQ teachers separately. 
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of schools, so studies on policy effect have often been interested in it (e.g., Alexander, 
2002). Moreover, there has been increased interest in student achievement as an indicator 
of school accountability. The No Child Left Behind Act, requiring all students to achieve 
proficiencies measured by statewide standardized tests in reading, math, and science by 
2014, reflects this increased interest. Student achievement would be an important 
indicator that schools in the No Child Left Behind era should manage. 
ACPs intend to improve student achievement in schools (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
By guaranteeing higher compensation for improved student achievement, ACPs are 
assumed to motivate teachers to put more effort into improving student achievement. 
Adding to the motivation, ACPs support teachers in developing their knowledge and 
skills, and this can also lead to improved student achievement. As a result, student 
achievement in schools implementing ACPs will be expected to improve.  
ACPs and Charter Schools 
The last and distinctive concern of this study was about whether the effects of 
ACPs are different for different school types, focusing on charter schools compared to 
traditional public schools. Charter schools are public schools operated with more 
autonomy than traditional public schools in exchange for more accountability for the 
educational outcomes that they declare in their own charters (Hubbard & Kulkarni, 
2009). With increasing concern about parents’ rights for education and school 
accountability, charter schools are expected to provide innovation, competition, and 
academic improvement (Hubbard & Kulkarni, 2009). After the opening of the first 
charter school in St. Paul, Minnesota in 1992, there were 5,274 charter schools (Keaton, 
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2012, p. 7) serving 1,787,091 students (about 3.6% of the total of 49,177,617 students)  in 
the United States in the 2010–11 academic year (Keaton, 2012, p. 9). 
Previous studies on charter schools have compared them to traditional public 
schools (TPS). Yeh (2007) averaged the charter schools’ effect sizes from three large-
scale studies with panel data (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, & Branch, 
2005; Sass, 2006) that used rigorous statistical methods, considering student fixed effects 
to control for observable and unobservable characteristics that could cause selection bias. 
Yeh found negative average effects (-0.088 SD in reading and -0.116 SD in math).
2
  
One reason for the negative effect of charter schools could be the staffing 
problems in charter schools. Charter schools are facing lower teacher retention rates than 
TPS, and typically have a smaller percentage of experienced teachers, a valuable teacher 
group in which this study is interested (Carruthers, 2012; Cowen & Winters, 2012; Stuit 
& Smith, 2012). These difficulties in staffing are often associated with low student 
achievement in charter schools (Carruthers, 2012; Stuit & Smith, 2012). 
The staffing problems in charter schools seem to be associated with low salary 
and difficult working conditions. For example, according to the analysis of Stuit and 
Smith (2012) on self-reported reasons of teachers’ leaving, teachers who left charter 
schools were more likely to indicate salary and working conditions, including 
                                                 
 
2
 This unexpected negative effect could be related with time. As Yeh (2007) summarized, when charter 
schools only operating for five or more years were considered in the three reviewed studies, the average 
effect size for charter schools turned out to be positive (0.009 SD in reading and 0.001 SD in math). This 
result shows a possibility that charter schools’ effect on student achievement would be improved as they 
mature with time. However, as Carruthers (2012) pointed out, there are many variations in charter schools’ 
effects on student achievement, and more studies are needed to examine which school factors would be 
improved during the maturation to increase student achievement. This study focuses on the staffing 
problems of charter schools rather than time as an important factor associated with low student 
achievement of charter schools, as stated in the next paragraph. 
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administrative support, as reasons for leaving their schools than teachers who left TPS. 
In summary, charter schools generally have worse working conditions and lower 
salaries than TPS, which could result in lower retention rates and lower student 
achievement. Therefore, if charter schools participated in ACPs to improve their working 
conditions and salary, they could improve teacher retention rates and student 
achievement.  
More importantly, the effect sizes of ACPs in charter schools could be larger than 
those in TPS. According to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility in Economics, 
“an extra dollar of [input] provides a poor [school] with more additional utility than an 
extra dollar would provide to a rich [school]” (Mankiw, 2009, p. 442). If the diminishing 
marginal utility assumption was applied to the utility from additional input on teacher 
salary and working conditions, charter schools could get more utility than TPS from the 
same amount of input on teacher salary and working conditions. That is, if the same 
amount of extra input is provided to each type of school, marginal utility in charter 
schools could be bigger than in TPS because of the lower base level in the former. Thus, 
incentive-based programs could lead to higher improvement in teacher retention rates and 
student achievement in charter school environments.  
Empirical Studies on the Effect of Alternative Teacher Compensation Programs 
There is little evidence on the effect of ACPs on teachers or students. For 
example, Springer et al. (2009) analyzed the case of the Governor’s Educator Excellence 
Grant (GEEG) Program of Texas, which is a form of ACP. They found that the GEEG 
program was significantly related to the higher retention rate of all teachers only in the 
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first implementing year but not in the second and third years. Therefore, it is difficult to 
say that the ACPs would increase the overall teacher retention rates. In the GEEG 
program, overall, teachers were not satisfied with the changing professional development 
support enough to change their retention-related decision making. 
However, Springer and his colleagues showed evidence that the amount of 
incentives that individual teachers received affected the probability of the teachers 
leaving. In the study, teachers who received a large amount of incentive pay (e.g., more 
than $1,150 in the first year) showed a significantly reduced probability to leave their 
schools than the probability they would have showed when they were without the ACP 
program. In contrast, teachers who received a small amount of incentive pay (e.g., less 
than $650 in the first year) had a significantly increased probability to leave their schools. 
Based on this result, the GEEG seemed to affect the retention rate of a certain group of 
teachers who received a large amount of incentive pay.  
The group of teachers receiving a large amount of incentive pay was assumed to 
meet high-performance criteria required by the ACPs. In this sense, as Lazear (2003) 
argued, the GEEG would function as a mechanism of teacher sorting. It, however, did not 
result in the improvement in student achievement at least within the three years 
examined. Even though Springer and his colleagues argued that the teacher sorting effect 
would result in the improvement of student achievement in the long term, they have not 
yet tested that assumption. 
Springer et al. (2009) also found consistent results in another ACP program 
implemented in Texas, called the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program. 
The TEEG program ran for three years starting in the 2006–07 school year. They found 
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that the TEEG program was not significantly related to improvements in the teacher 
retention rate. However, they also found that teachers with a large amount of incentive 
pay showed reduced probability of leaving their schools, while teachers with a small 
amount of the pay expressed increased probability of leaving, as in the GEEG study. In 
the relationship between the TEEG and student achievement, the authors did not find any 
evidence of a significant relationship. 
The third study reviewed is that of Glazerman and Seifullah (2010), who analyzed 
the effect of another ACP program, called the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in 
Chicago. They found that the retention rates of schools participating in the TAP program 
were not significantly different from those of non-participant schools, which is consistent 
with the two studies above. They also compared the Skills, Knowledge, and 
Responsibilities (SKR) scores, which is an evaluation of scores based on the classroom 
observation rubric across stayers, movers, and leavers.
3
 The SKR scores are rated on a 
five-point scale, with 1 indicating “needs improvement” and 5 indicating “exemplary”. 
They found that the average SKR scores were 3.1 for all teachers, 3.1 for stayers, 2.8 for 
movers, and 3.2 for leavers. They reported that an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
rejected the equality of the average SKR scores across groups (alpha level=0.05), which 
means that there was at least one significant difference among the three groups. However, 
this does not mean that the TAP programs are more likely to hold more effective teachers 
and that the less effective teachers would leave. That is, the stayers had lower SKR scores 
                                                 
 
3
 Stayers referred to teachers who stayed in schools where they taught in the previous year. Movers are 
teachers who moved to another school within the district whereas leavers referred to those who left the 
district altogether, which includes cases of leaving teaching profession, moving to another public school 
out of the district or teaching in private schools. 
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than the leavers and higher SKR scores than the movers. Therefore, contrary to the two 
studies above, there is little evidence that the TAP program in Chicago can hold a certain 
group of teachers more than any other group. 
In a recent peer-reviewed journal, Goldhaber and Walch (2012) reported a mixed 
effect of an ACP in Denver, the Professional Compensation System for Teachers 
(ProComp). “When [they] compare voluntary enrollees to teachers in ProComp years 
who choose to never enroll, the effect is statistically significant and positive in middle 
school math but not significant in [high school] or [reading]” (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012, 
p. 1076). 
In summary, the four previous studies showed mixed evidence on the relationship 
between the alternative teacher compensation programs and teacher retention rates (See 
Table II-1). And the positive relationships were limited in the first year of 
implementation in the two Texas cases. The associations of the ACPs and student 
achievement were also mixed. Even though the study in Denver found a positive effect in 
middle school math, the effect of ACPs was insignificant in the other school levels or 
subjects. In the Texas GEEG case, a negative effect was reported. 
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< Table II- 1 > Quantitative Studies of the Causal Effect of Teacher Incentive Programs on Teacher Retention Rate and Student 
Achievement 
Study Sample 
Time Span 
of Study 
Effect on overall Teacher 
Retention  
Effect on Student 
Achievement 
Glazerman 
and Seifullah 
(2010) 
Chicago elementary schools 
(TAP*, participants and non-
participants) 
2007–08 to 
2008–09  
Not significant Not significant 
Goldhaber 
and Walch 
(2012) 
Student in the Denver public 
schools (students  taught by 
ProComp** voluntary participant, 
compulsory participant, and non-
participant teachers) 
2002–03 to 
2009–10 
 
Not Applicable Positive in middle school 
math but insignificant in 
middle school reading, 
high school math and 
reading 
Springer et 
al. (2009b) 
Texas schools (TEEG*** 
participants and non-participants) 
2006–07 to 
2008–09 
Not Significant Not Significant 
Springer et 
al. (2009a) 
Texas schools (GEEG**** 
participants and non-participants) 
2005–06 to 
2007–08 
Positively Significant for the first 
year of the Program,  
Not Significant for the second 
and the third year 
Negative***** 
* The TAP is the abbreviation for the Teacher Advancement Program 
** The ProComp is the abbreviation for the Denver Professional Compensation System for Teachers 
*** The TEEG is the abbreviation for the Texas Educator Excellence Grant program 
**** The GEEG is the abbreviation for the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant program of Texas 
***** The study adopted four analytical models and three sampling groups, and the results were slightly different across models and 
samplings. This study accepted the results of the fourth model, which employed the most rigorous analytical strategy by including 
student and school fixed effects and sampling students in all schools participating in the program regardless of the criteria by which a 
school was participating in the program. 
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These mixed results regarding the effect of ACPs on teacher retention rates and 
student achievement make it difficult for policymakers to be conclusive about the effect 
of ACPs. One reason for the mixed results could be a relatively short implementation 
period. Among the studies mentioned above, only Goldhaber and Walch’s study analyzed 
an ACP that had been implemented for five years. On the other hand, the other studies 
examined the effect of ACPs that had been implemented for no more than three years. 
Considering that teachers would need time to adjust to the new program, more studies are 
needed for ACP cases implemented for a term longer than three years. This study plans to 
investigate changes in student achievement and teacher retention rates in Minnesota 
public schools over eight years, 2003–2010. Because Q Comp began in the 2005–2006 
school year, the research period makes it possible to examine up to five years of the Q 
Comp implementation effect. 
The mixed results, moreover, could be associated with variations of ACPs in the 
components and institutional settings where ACPs have been implemented. The mixed 
nature of the evidence calls for further exploration of which factors may facilitate or 
impede the effect of ACPs. This study extends the literature by looking specifically at 
school type, charter school or traditional public school, as a factor to consider when 
examining the effects of ACPs. Charter schools have been reported to have more 
difficulties than traditional public schools in supporting teachers’ professional 
development (Stuit & Smith, 2012). Considering the assumption of diminishing marginal 
utility in economics, ACPs could have higher incremental effects in charter school 
environments than in traditional public schools. 
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This study aimed to contribute to research on ACPs, giving empirical evidence on 
the effects of Minnesota Q Comp, for which there has been little reported research. This 
study also examined whether duration of implementation and school type is related to the 
effect of ACPs, which could help to explain the mixed effects that previous studies have 
reported.  
Consideration of duration of implementation and school type could provide 
valuable and practical information for policymakers considering implementation of ACPs. 
Based on the information, they could estimate how much time it would take to see a 
visible effect of ACPs. Also, the information could help policymakers to establish 
priorities in their implementation of ACPs across different types of schools. 
Previous studies have examined the effect of ACPs on teacher retention and 
student achievement (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Springer, Lewis, Podgursky, Ehlert, 
Gronberg, et al., 2009; Springer, Lewis, Podgursky, Ehlert, Taylor, et al., 2009). There 
are, however, few empirical studies that have been done on the impact of Minnesota Q 
Comp.  
Moreover, there are few studies on the distinctive effects of Q Comp associated 
with school types, e.g., charter school versus TPS. Therefore, this study contributed to the 
studies on ACPs by providing information on the Minnesota case and the differential 
impact of ACPs based on school type. It gives practical information for school 
policymakers and charter school leaders in the implementation of ACPs.  
The study could also contribute to teacher retention research. As DeAngelis and 
Presley (2011) found,  there still remains much unexplained variation in teacher retention 
in spite of the many studies on school factors, including urbanicity and characteristics of 
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student population. Based on this finding, they argued that school policymakers should 
identify and provide more targeted assistance to schools beyond urbanicity and student 
demographics. This study could contribute to teacher retention research by exploring the 
possibility that charter schools could be a target group for staffing-related assistance and 
that ACPs could be an effective way to assist that target group. 
Research Questions 
In summary, this study proposes four research questions on the effect of ACPs. 
All questions are analyzed at the school level. 
(1) Do alternative compensation programs (ACPs) for teachers have an impact on 
schools’ overall teacher retention rates? 
(2) Do alternative compensation programs (ACPs) for teachers have an impact on 
schools’ retention rates of teachers with three or more years of teaching 
experience? 
(3) Do alternative compensation programs (ACPs) for teachers have an impact on 
student achievement? 
(4) Do alternative compensation programs (ACPs) for teachers have a different 
impact in charter schools compared to traditional public schools? Specifically: 
a. Do alternative compensation programs have a different impact on the 
overall teacher retention rates of charter schools compared to traditional 
public schools? 
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b. Do alternative compensation programs have a different impact on schools’ 
retention rates of teachers with three or more years of teaching experience 
in charter schools compared to traditional public schools? 
c. Do alternative compensation programs have a different impact on schools’ 
student achievement in charter schools compared to traditional public 
schools? 
The first two questions are about teacher retention rates, and the third question 
focuses on student achievement. The fourth question repeats the initial three questions 
and asks whether the impacts are different based on school type, focusing on a 
comparison between charter schools and traditional public schools. This analysis was 
done by inclusion of a dummy variable for charter schools and an interaction variable of 
charter schools and ACP. More description on the equations used is in the discussion of 
the methods of analysis section of this study. 
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CHAPTER III: METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND DATA 
This study used data from the Minnesota public schools to answer the research 
questions identified in the previous chapter. Minnesota has implemented an ACP, Quality 
Compensation (Q Comp), since the 2005–06 academic year. Minnesota is also the state 
where the first charter school in the United States opened in 1992. Therefore, examining 
Minnesota can offer useful insight on the effect of ACPs for a relatively long term of 
implementation and the interaction effect between ACPs and charter schools. 
Minnesota Public Schools and Quality Compensation Program 
According to an explanation of the Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor 
(MOLA, 2009), Minnesota has developed a Q Comp program based on the experiences 
of education reform, including professional learning communities (PLCs), standard-based 
teacher evaluation systems, and financial incentives to improve teacher performance. In 
other words, the Q Comp program results from multiple streams of education reform, 
which can explain why the Q Comp program has five components correlated with each 
other. 
Components of Minnesota Q Comp program 
With a look at the five components of Q Comp (See Table III-1), we note that the 
Q Comp program not only compensates teachers based on how their students perform, 
but also gives incentives to teachers with advancement on the career ladder, professional 
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teacher development, and leadership in the professional development of groups of 
teachers.  
 
< Table III- 1 > Q Comp Components 
  Description 
Career Advancement 
Opportunities  
Career advancement opportunities allow teachers to take on 
leadership roles while retaining a presence in the classroom. 
These positions typically allow the teacher to continue to 
teach on a part-time basis. Some opportunities are full time 
for a limited term, typically no more than one to three years, 
after which the teacher returns to the classroom.  
Professional 
Development  
Under Q Comp, professional development must take place 
on site, during the school day, and be led by trained teacher 
leaders.  
Teacher Evaluations  Teacher evaluations are conducted several times during the 
year by a locally trained team using multiple criteria.  
Performance-Based 
Pay  
Performance-based pay must be tied to (1) school-wide 
student achievement, (2) measures of student achievement 
for a teacher’s own students, and (3) teacher evaluations.  
Alternative Salary 
Schedule  
Q Comp participants must reform their “steps and lanes” 
salary schedule so that teachers are no longer automatically 
rewarded for additional years of experience.  
Note. From Q Comp: Quality compensation for teachers : Evaluation report by 
Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, 2009, p. 20.  
 
MOLA (2009) reviewed various examples of how Q Comp schools have been 
implementing the five components. From the review, they found that Q Comp schools 
use career advancement opportunities to create leadership position for PLCs, mentor 
position for new teachers, or data analysts, peer evaluators, and researchers’ positions to 
identify pedagogical best practices. They also reported that the professional development 
component helps Q Comp schools to “give teachers opportunities to share teaching 
strategies, analyze student performance, … evaluate or observe other teachers, … discuss 
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educational research and learn new curricula” (p. 22). Certainly, the opportunities 
identified in this report could be offered in schools with traditional salary schedules. This 
report, however, showed that Q Comp schools actively used the professional 
development component to give teachers professional development opportunities. Q 
Comp schools evaluate their teachers in various ways, including peer observations. The 
results of teacher evaluations are often used as criteria for the performance-based pay 
component. Q Comp schools also use school-wide achievement gains or individual 
teacher-wide achievement gains as criteria for performance-based pay. Q Comp schools 
are required to reform salary schedule based on performance measures. MOLA (2009) 
found some Q Comp schools with such a low standard in performance measures that 
most teachers can move forward almost automatically on the salary schedule. Other Q 
Comp schools, on the other hand, linked salary increase to the completion of an action-
research project, teacher evaluation, or additional responsibilities.  
Teachers who were in Q Comp schools showed positive responses on the Q Comp 
components, especially on the professional development. When MOLA asked teachers in 
Q Comp schools “how creating leadership positions and career advancement 
opportunities for teachers has affected the respondent’s school district or charter school,” 
61% of respondents indicated a positive or strongly positive effect. For questions about 
the effectiveness of professional development programs offered by ACPs, more than half 
of the respondents agreed that it had a positive or strongly positive effect. Another study 
also reported that “when teachers spoke positively about Q Comp, they noted most often 
the support they are receiving to improve their practice” (Wahlstrom et al., 2006, p. 9). 
Those results suggest that teachers experiencing Q Comp perceive the ACP to be 
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supportive of their professional development. This supports the assumption that there is a 
positive relationship between Q Comp and the teacher retention rates of schools. 
Funding for Q Comp 
Schools participating in the Q Comp program (Q Comp schools) can receive 
additional revenue of up to $260 per student for the program from state aid and local 
levies (Minnesota Department of Education, 2010). According to MOLA’s (2009) report, 
Q Comp aid from the state was $260 per student in fiscal year 2006, the first year of 
implementation, and $190.06 per student in fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009. It, 
however, had decreased to $169 per student from fiscal year 2010 onwards by the 2008 
Legislature. MOLA (2009) stated that this reduction in Q Comp aid exacerbated school 
staff’s concern that Q Comp funding would not be continued. Considering that some 
schools accepted Q Comp in order to have an alternative funding stream (Wahlstrom et 
al., 2006), this concern could be a barrier against participating in the program. 
The local levy for Q Comp is optional. If school districts decided to issue a levy, 
they can do within a limitation that the total Q Comp fund of state aid and local levy 
should be less than the maximum amount of $260 × student enrollment. For example, 
because the state aid was 190.06 per student in 2007,  school districts could decide the 
amount of levy within a range from zero to $69.94 × student enrollment ($260 – $190.06 
= $69.94). By law (Minnesota Statutes 2008, 126C.10, subd. 34(a)), charter schools 
cannot conduct a levy and receive additional state aid based on the average per pupil Q 
Comp revenue (state aid plus local levy) of all Q Comp schools of the state. According to 
MOLA’s (2009) report, 85% of Q Comp districts in 2008 levied for Q Comp funds, and 
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94% of the levies were for the maximum amount (i.e., $260 per pupil after adding state 
aid). Q Comp charter schools in 2008 received an estimated $249.72 per pupil as Q 
Comp aid from the state. 
Q Comp Participation Rates 
Beginning with 72 schools in the 2005–06 school year, the number of Q Comp 
schools increased to 333 in 2009–10 (See Table III-2). The number of Q Comp schools 
largely increased between the 2005–06 and 2006–07 school years, but the rate of growth 
has slowed since 2007–08. Although we could speculate that this waning might be 
related to the reduction of state aid mentioned above, there is no study on the reason for 
the slowdown. 
 
< Table III- 2 > Participation Rate of Minnesota Public Schools in Q Comp 
Academic Traditional Public School  Charter School 
Year All* Q Comp** % Q Comp  All* Q Comp** % Q Comp 
2002–03 1,605 0 0.0%  81 0 0.0% 
2003–04 1,616 0 0.0%  96 0 0.0% 
2004–05 1,622 0 0.0%  116 0 0.0% 
2005–06 1,631 67 4.1%  142 5 3.5% 
2006–07 1,636 243 14.9%  147 21 14.3% 
2007–08 1,648 285 17.3%  160 29 18.1% 
2008–09 1,647 297 18.0%  169 35 20.7% 
2009–10 1,632 293 18.0%  170 40 23.5% 
*The numbers of all traditional public schools and charter schools are from the eighth and 
seventh column, respectively, in Table III-3 of this study. 
**The number of Q Comp schools is counted by author based on annual reports of Q 
Comp basic aid and total revenue by Minnesota Department of Education (Minnesota 
Department of Education, 2006b, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
 
We also found that charter schools would be more likely to participate in the Q 
Comp compared to the traditional public schools after 2007–08 (we will describe below 
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the way we use the term, traditional public school, and the way we count the number of 
schools in this study). The growth rate for Q Comp participation among charter schools 
largely increased between 2005–06 and 2006–07 as it did among traditional public 
schools. It also slowed down after 2007–08 but not as much as in traditional public 
schools. 
Identifying Schools of Research Objective 
In Table III-2, this study presented the annual Q Comp participation rates. The 
rates were calculated by this study with a way of counting the number of Minnesota 
public schools and the term, traditional public schools, was used with a certain 
operational definition. The way of counting and the definition were related to the 
identified research objective of this study. Therefore, it is necessary to explain those 
terms in more detail.  
To examine the effect of Q Comp, this study observed Minnesota public schools 
from the 2002–03 through the 2009–10 academic years. The first year of the Q Comp 
was the 2005–06 school year. To compare school-level teacher retention rates and 
student achievement before and after Q Comp implementation, this study observed 
school-level data in 2002–03, three years before the first Q Comp year, through the 
2009–10 academic year, which was the last academic year for which individual school 
data are available. This research period from 2002–03 to 2009–10 allowed this study to 
trace the effect of Q Comp for the full five years of implementation of those schools that 
implemented the program from its beginning in 2005–06. 
To create a list of research schools during the research period, this study started 
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from annual reports of student enrollment by gender and ethnicity posted on the MDE 
website (The MDE website is now posting the data files from 2005–06 to 2009–2010. 
Data from 2003–04 and 2004–05 were downloaded from the same website in 2010 by 
author. Data for 2002–03 were obtained through email contact with MDE). From the 
reports, 16,633 non-charter schools were listed in total (the second column of Table III-
3). This includes 2,092 non-charter schools in 2002–03; the number had increased to 
2,089 in 2007–08 and then decreased to 2,046 in 2009–10 in the non-charter school 
sector. On the other hand, there were 1,140 charter schools, including 88 in 2002–03 and 
179 in 2009–10 (the third column of Table III-3). As a result, a total of 17,773 schools 
were listed in the starting point (the fourth column of Table III-3). 
 
< Table III- 3 > Number of Minnesota Schools from the 2002–03 to the 2009–10 
Academic Year 
Academic Starting Point 
 
After Consideration of School 
Classification 
Year Non-Charter Charter Total  TPS* Charter Total 
2002–03 2,092 88 2,180  1,524 81 1,605 
2003–04 2,087 101 2,188  1,520 96 1,616 
2004–05 2,091 122 2,213  1,506 116 1,622 
2005–06 2,091 149 2,240  1,489 142 1,631 
2006–07 2,088 155 2,243  1,489 147 1,636 
2007–08 2,089 168 2,257  1,488 160 1,648 
2008–09 2,049 178 2,227  1,478 169 1,647 
2009–10 2,046 179 2,225  1,462 170 1,632 
Total 16,633 1,140 17,773   11,956 1,081 13,037 
* TPS: Traditional Public School 
Note. The number of schools in this table are counted by author from data file of 
Minnesota Department of Education (n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f, n.d.-g, 
n.d.-h) with R (version 3.0.2) statistical software. 
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The listed schools in the left panel of Table III-3 not only include public schools 
offering general education to K-12 graders but also other schools specializing in 
alternative learning programs, distance learning programs, delinquent and correctional 
programs, and special education programs. This study focuses on the comparison of the 
Q Comp effect in general K–12 public schools, excluding the specially classified schools. 
It is difficult to measure teacher retention rates and student achievement in the same way 
for those specialized schools as for general schools. For example, teacher retention rates 
in distance learning programs or student achievement in special education programs 
would be measured in different ways. Therefore, this study excludes the special types of 
schools from the analyses.  
To exclude the specially classified schools, this study considered the school 
classification code to focus on general K–12 program schools. The MDE classifies 
schools into 31 groups based on characteristics of program. As seen in Table III-4, 
general K–12 education programs were coded as 10 (elementary), 20 (middle), 31 (junior 
high), 32 (senior high), 33 (secondary), and 40 (elementary and secondary). By contrast, 
there were schools for students with special needs, for example, special education (code 
50), vocational program (code 60), or delinquent student/correctional program (code 70). 
Among schools with 10, 20, 31, 32, 33, and 40 classification codes, this study 
considered district type code to identify “charter schools” and “traditional public 
schools”. Because the MDE assigns 7 to charter schools as their district type code, 
schools coded as 7 in district type code were considered as charter schools and the other 
schools were referred to as traditional public schools in this study. 
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< Table III- 4 > School Site Classification in Minnesota 
Code Classification Description 
#of schools 
in 2011–12 
10 Elementary (PK–6) 919 
20 Middle School (5–8) 185 
31 Junior High (7–8 or 7–9) 35 
32 Senior High (9–12) 212 
33 Secondary (7–12) 219 
40 Elem/Sec Combo (K–12)  18 
41 ALC 172 
42 ALP 42 
43 Private Alternative Program 15 
44 Reserved 0 
45 Targeted Services 0 
46 Distance Learning Program (state approved) 14 
50 Special Education 242 
51 Special Education  ESY (Extended School Year) 0 
55 Combined Spec Ed & Voc Ed Program 2 
60 Secondary Vocational Program 1 
70 Delinquent Student/Correctional Program 12 
71 Miscellaneous Program (assignment is now limited) 7 
72 Neglected Student Program, Title 1 1 
73 Homeless Student Program, Title 1 1 
74 Hospital/Medical/Partial Hospitalization Program 10 
75 Telecommunications District 0 
76 
Educational Oversight to Private Residential Care & 
Treatment 3 
77 
Educational Oversight to Public Residential Care & 
Treatment 51 
78 Educational Oversight to Private Day Treatment Program 0 
79 Educational Oversight to Public Day Treatment Program 22 
80 Technical Colleges (PSEO) 0 
81 Post Secondary School/Program 0 
82 Community & Adult Education Program 0 
83 Early Childhood Screening 0 
90 Administrative Program 0 
Note. From School site classifications by Minnesota Department of Education (n.d.-i).  
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As a result of this consideration, the number of schools included in the analysis 
was 1,605 in the 2002–03 and 1,632 in the 2009–10 academic year (the fifth column in 
Table III-3). The number of charter schools was 81 in 2002–03 and 170 in 2009–10 as 
shown in the sixth column in Table III-3. The numbers of TPS were 1,524 in 2002–03 
and 1,462 in 2009–10 (the seventh column in Table III-3). In total, this study had 13,037 
cases (the bottom row in Table III-3), which consist of 11,956 TPS cases from 1,620 TPS 
schools (over 8 years examined) and 1,081 cases from 197 charter schools (over 8 years 
examined). 
Research Model 
The research questions regarding the association between ACPs and teacher 
retention rate are related to a teacher retention model with the dependent variables 
capturing overall teacher retention rates and rates for experienced teachers. The third 
research question is related to student achievement. The fourth research question 
addresses the interaction effect between school type and Q Comp participation. The 
interaction effect is a statistical term referring to an additional effect of Q Comp on each 
dependent variable when school type is changed from TPS to charter schools (Agresti & 
Finlay, 1997; Howell, 2007). The interaction effect will be additionally considered for the 
models for research questions (1) through (3).  
Therefore, two research models are required to answer the four main research 
questions. The first model, the teacher retention model, is about research question (1), 
(2), (4a), and (4b). The second model, the student achievement model, addresses research 
questions (3) and (4c). 
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Research Model for Teacher Retention 
According to previous studies (Hanushek et al., 2004; Imazeki, 2005; Reichardt & 
Buhler, 2002), teacher retention is a function of characteristics of individual teachers, 
working conditions of schools, amount of salary, personnel policies of schools, and 
economic conditions of communities. School type, whether schools are charter schools or 
not, has also been reported to be associated with teacher retention (Carruthers, 2012; 
Cowen & Winters, 2012; Stuit & Smith, 2012). Although the previous studies we have 
referred to are functions of teacher-level analysis, this study assumes that the same 
factors are present in a teacher retention function for school-level analysis. Based on the 
teacher retention function, this study illustrates a conceptual model for examining 
research questions (1), (2), (4a), and (4b) as shown in Figure 1.  
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[ Figure III- 1 ] Conceptual Model for Teacher Retention Rate Analysis 
 
Retention rate. This study was interested in two dependent variables regarding 
teacher retention: (1) overall school-level retention rates of teachers who taught academic 
core subjects in the previous academic year and (2) school-level retention rates of 
teachers with three or more years of teaching experience. To calculate teacher retention 
rates, this study compared two subsequent years of teacher lists of a school. Teachers 
who appeared on both years of teacher lists were considered to be retained in the school 
in the subsequent year and this study called them “stayers”. Teacher retention rates were 
calculated by the number of stayers over the number of teachers in the previous school 
year. For example, school A’s retention rate of 2010 was calculated by the number of 
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teachers who were listed in both the 2009–10 and 2010–11 teacher list (stayers in 2010-
11 school year) over the number of teachers who were listed in the 2009–10 teacher list 
of school A. The dependent variables calculated in this way are continuous variables. 
Each dependent variable called for an independent analysis.  
Based on the previous studies referred to above, four groups of factors were 
controlled to examine the association between the retention rates and Q Comp: Teacher 
characteristics at the school level, working conditions of schools, and school type.  
Teacher characteristics. According to Kirby and Grissmer (1993), teacher 
retention is associated with teachers’ age. The older teachers are, the more teachers are 
likely to stay in the teaching profession. They also found that female teachers were more 
likely to leave the teaching profession than males were as measured in annual leaving 
rates. When teachers were considered who returned to the teaching profession a few years 
later, however, there was little difference between male and female teachers in permanent 
leaving rate. This study is not about permanent retention rates but annual retention rates. 
Therefore, this study considered gender a characteristic of teachers associated with 
retention rates. One more teacher characteristic considered in the previous studies is 
teaching experience. For example, Hanushek et al.’s (2004) study found that teachers 
with higher levels of experience were less likely to move out of their districts if they 
stayed in teaching. Additionally, teachers with 31 or more years of teaching experience 
were more likely to leave the teaching profession. They argued that “as a teacher gains 
more experience, … the potential gains are frequently limited by restrictions on the 
transferability of experience credit across districts, affecting salary and other attributes of 
the job” (Hanushek et al., 2004, p. 332). They also assumed that the higher probability of 
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teachers with 31 or more years of experience in teaching leaving the profession would be 
related to retirement. This study included teacher characteristic variables aggregated to 
the school level such as average age and percentage of female teachers in schools. This 
study also considered the teaching experience of teachers by employing dummy variables 
that captured the percentage of teachers with 5 to 9, 10 to 29, and 30 or more years of 
teaching experience. The percentage of teachers with 0 to 4 years of teaching experience 
was the reference for the dummy variables. 
Working conditions of schools. The working conditions of schools that influence 
teachers’ decisions to work in the schools is generally captured by demographic 
characteristics of students and the student-teacher ratio (Clotfelter et al., 2011; Reichardt 
& Buhler, 2002). This study also accounted for working conditions by including the 
percentage of minority students, percentage of low-income students, and student-teacher 
ratio as Clotfelter et al. (2011) and Reichardt and Buhler (2002) did.  
School size was also considered as a school characteristic associated with teacher 
retention. When a school is very small, teachers may be asked to teach many different 
courses (Imazeki & Goe, 2009), which may increase teacher dissatisfaction. Therefore, 
school size as measured by the number of enrolled students was included in the model.  
The economic environment of schools is known to be related to teacher retention 
of schools (Hanushek et al., 2004; Reichardt & Buhler, 2002). When the economic 
environment is good, there are many jobs open to teachers, which could reduce the 
teacher retention rates of schools. As a proxy for the economic environment of schools, 
previous studies have used the unemployment rate of communities in which schools are 
located (Hanushek et al., 2004; Reichardt & Buhler, 2002). This study included 
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unemployment rate of communities in the model. 
This study did not include an important indicator of working conditions, the level 
of monetary compensation (Clotfelter et al., 2011; Hanushek et al., 2004; Imazeki, 2005). 
Previous studies represented the level of monetary compensation with salary of teachers 
with zero experience and no graduate degree in single–salary schedule of each school 
district (e.g., Hanushek et al., 2004). Because of data limitations, however, this study 
could not consider this characteristic of schools. When this study calculated the average 
salary of teachers with zero experience and no graduate degree by district, there were 
many schools with no teachers with zero experience and no graduate degree (i.e., 1,894 
of the 12,708 cases (14.9%) analyzed in the retention model had no teachers at the lowest 
rung of the salary schedule). It would not be missed at random because schools with 
fewer number of teachers would be more likely to be missed in this variable. 
However, omitting this indicator of working conditions would not be problematic 
in this study because of two reasons. Firstly, the main concern of this study is the effect 
of ACPs, which is a policy on monetary compensation. Changes in the monetary 
compensation would be a part of this compensation policy. If we controlled for the 
changes in the monetary compensation, we would also control for a part of the policy 
effect. 
Secondly, this study adopted a school fixed effects model to control for time-
invariant unobservable variables across schools. This study assumed that schools’ 
characteristics related with salary schedules would not be largely changed across years 
unless they adopted the ACPs. That is, this study considered the characteristic of the 
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salary schedules of schools to be a time-invariant variable, which would be controlled for 
with consideration of school fixed effects. If my assumption on there being little change 
in salary schedules across years was realistic, omission of teacher salaries would not be 
problematic in estimating the effect of Q Comp.  
School type. Charter schools are known to be faced with more difficulties in 
retaining teachers than TPSs. For example, in a recent study using Florida public school 
data for 2002–2008, Cowen and Winters (2012) found that teachers in charter schools are 
more likely to leave the teaching profession than those in TPSs. Stuit and Smith (2012) 
also found an attrition rate gap between teachers in charter schools and those in TPSs in a 
study using the 2003–2004 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 2004–2005 
Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) of the National Center for Educational Statistics 
(NCES). They reported that the higher proportions of uncertified and inexperienced 
teachers in charter sector and poor working conditions could be related to the attrition 
rate gap. This study considered school type with a categorical variable where TPSs were 
coded as 0 and charter schools were coded as 1. 
Q Comp program. The main concern of this study was the associations of each 
dependent variable with the alternative compensation program in Minnesota, Q Comp. 
After controlling for the previous factors, this study examined the association between 
the identified dependent variables and Q Comp. The data were examined in two ways. 
Firstly, this study examined the difference in the retention rate between Q Comp and non-
Q comp schools. In this examination, the Q Comp variable was coded as 0 for non-Q 
Comp schools and 1 for Q Comp schools. Secondly, this study considered the number of 
years a school has implemented Q Comp. For the research period from 2002–03 to 2009–
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10, there were schools that have implemented Q Comp for at most five years (from 2005–
06 to 2009–10). This analysis required five dummy variables for years 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of 
implementation. The comparison group was schools that have not implemented Q Comp.   
Interaction between school type and Q Comp. Research question (4) was about 
the distinctive effect of Q Comp when charter schools implemented the program. The 
interaction term between school type and Q Comp addressed this research question. The 
coefficient of this term was about the effect of Q Comp when charter schools 
implemented the program compared to the effect of Q Comp when TPSs implemented it. 
Conceptual Model for Student Achievement 
Student achievement is known to be a function of student characteristics, teacher 
characteristics, and school characteristics (e.g., Archibald, 2006). Therefore, the 
conceptual model for student achievement is illustrated in Figure 2. In the model of this 
study, student and teacher characteristics were aggregated to the school level for use in 
the analysis.  
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[ Figure III- 2 ] Conceptual Model for Student Achievement Analysis 
 
Student achievement. This study used the Minnesota Comprehensive 
Assessment (MCA) test score to measure student achievement. The MCA is a statewide 
test implemented since 1998 for the purpose of statewide system accountability. The 
information from this test is also used to determine proficiency levels in each school and 
district for the purpose of determining Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for the No Child 
Left Behind legislation (Minnesota Department of Education, 2008a). This study used a 
school’s percentage of students who met or exceeded the Minnesota academic standard as 
a proxy for the level of student achievement of the school.  
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This study used the MCA reading and math results to capture the student 
achievement of schools. The MCA started testing third and fifth grade students on 
reading, mathematics, and writing subjects in 1998. By 2010, the MCA had been 
expanded to other grades (3–8th, 10th, and 11th). Test subjects have also changed. Writing 
has not been tested since 2006, and a test on science has been implemented only since 
2008. In the middle of the expansion, reading and math tests for third and fifth grade 
students have been consistently administered during the period of this study, 2002–03 
through 2009–10 (Minnesota Department of Education, 2008a).  
This study focused on changes in the MCA results of third graders. The third 
grade test result is considered to be important because it is associated with high school 
graduation (e.g., Hernandez, 2011). Therefore, this study observes changes of annual 
percentage of third grade students who met or exceeded the standard in reading and math 
MCA tests at the school level.  
There was a version change to MCA-II in 2005–06. This change makes it difficult 
to compare test scores of MCA and MCA-II. This study used the schools’ percentage of 
students who met or exceeded the standard rather than schools’ average test scores. Both 
MCA and MCA-II examined whether a student met the Minnesota Academic Standard of 
his/her grade for the tested subject. MCA classified student test scores into 5 levels (level 
1, 2a, 2b, 3, and 4). Students at or above level 2b were considered to meet the standard 
(Davison et al., 2004). MCA-II divided students into four proficiency levels. To meet the 
standard, students must be at or above level 3 (Minnesota Department of Education, 
2008a). Even though both exams were used to identify students who were at or above 
proficiency level, the version change would make a difference in the measurement of 
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student proficiency rates across versions. This study tested the effect of version change 
by regressing the dependent variable of student achievement on the version of MCA 
(which was considered as a dummy variable, 0 was for 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05 
and 1 was for 2005-06 through 2009-10 cases). In the test, this study found significant 
effect of version change (in Reading model, b = 0.031680, s.e. = 0.004475, t = 7.08, p < 
0.01 and in Mathematics model, b = 0.063360, s.e. = 0.004529, t = 13.99, p < 0.01). To 
address this problem, this study included year fixed effects that controlled for the effect 
of version changes as well as any other year-specific characteristics.  
Considering year fixed effects would not be the best way to address this problem. 
The best way would be if the two versions were vertically aligned across the proficiency 
level (Case & Zucker, 2005) and if we included information of the MCA-II version 
scores corresponding to the MCA version cutoff scores. This study, however, did not 
have information on this. Under the limited situation of this study, considering year fixed 
effects would be a good way to address this problem.  
To test the possibility of the year fixed effects to control for the version change 
effects, this study did a comparison as follows. First, this study considered the estimated 
difference between the two versions of MCA, the coefficient of the first version in the 
regression analysis mentioned above, 0.031680 in reading and 0.06336 in math, and the 
effect of the version change. Second, the estimated version change effect was subtracted 
from each dependent variable only for MCA-II cases, 2005-06 through 2009-10 to 
correct the dependent variables for the version change. Third, the student achievement 
models with the corrected dependent variable and with the not-corrected dependent 
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variable were analyzed. Fourth, the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the 
coefficients were compared between the two models.  
Through the comparison, this study found the coefficients and standard errors of 
independent variables were same except for the year dummies of 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
and 2010, when new version of MCA was administered. The differences between the two 
models in the coefficient of year 2006, year 2007, year 2008, year 2009, and year 2010 
were 0.03168 in reading model and 0.06336 in math model, which was the estimated 
effect of version change. Moreover, the standard errors of year 2006, year 2007, year 
2008, year 2009, and year 2010 were the same in both models. From the results, 
considering year fixed effects could be a possible alternative for controlling for the 
estimated effect of version change under the limited context of this study.  
In summary, this study used third grade mathematics and reading test results on 
MCA tests (MCA-II since 2005–06) to measure the level of student achievement of 
schools. The school’s percentage of students at or above proficiency level in each test 
represents the level of student achievement of schools.   
School characteristics. Aggregated student characteristics, percentage of 
minority students, and percentage of low-income students were included in the model. 
The effect of class size on student achievement has been known to be the most promising 
in grades K–3 (Robinson, 1990). Since this study used third grade scores, this additional 
control may be warranted. To capture class size at the school level, this study considered 
student-teacher ratio, which was calculated by the student enrollment over the total full 
time equivalent (FTE) of teachers.  
   58 
School type. This study considered two types of schools, traditional public 
schools (TPS) and charter schools. This study identified charter schools with a 
categorical variable where TPSs were coded as 0 and charter schools were coded as 1.  
Q Comp program. Research question (3) of this study focused on the 
associations of student achievement with Q Comp implementation. After controlling for 
the previous factors, this study examined the association between the dependent variables 
and Q Comp. As in the retention rates model, the examination was operated in two ways: 
(1) only considering Q Comp implementation and (2) considering the years of 
implementation of Q Comp. 
 Interaction between school type and Q Comp. The research question (4c) was 
about the interaction effect between school type and Q Comp. By addressing this 
interaction effect, this study compared the effect of Q Comp on student achievement 
when charter schools implemented the program to the effect of Q Comp when TPSs 
implemented it. 
Analytical Technique 
This study used a data set of Minnesota public schools to examine the effect of 
the Q Comp program. By regressing each dependent variable on independent variables, 
this study estimated coefficients of each independent variable. The main concern of this 
study was the coefficient of Q Comp implementation.  
To increase precision in estimation, this study used longitudinal data where 
variables of Minnesota public schools are repeatedly measured. The longitudinal design 
observed multiple occasions before and after treatment. This multiple observation 
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increases the number of observation so that the temporality of the data is reduced (Heck, 
2004). Therefore, this study observes repeatedly measured school data for eight years, at 
least three years before the Q Comp and up to five years after the Q Comp was initially 
implemented. 
Omitted Variables Problem 
In addition to increasing the number of observations, a longitudinal study, such as 
this one, makes it possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron, 2005). As 
mentioned in the previous section, the Q Comp is a voluntary program, so the Q Comp 
treatment was not randomly assigned across schools. Without random assignment of 
schools to research groups, this study may face an omitted variables bias problem, which 
would produce biased estimates (Cook, 2002; Heckman, 1979).  
In other words, because Q Comp was not randomly assigned across schools, it is 
possible that there are significant differences in the average school between Q Comp and 
non-Q Comp schools. For example, let us think about the quality of principal leadership 
of schools. Leadership quality is known to be associated with teacher retention and 
achievement (Leithwood & Louis, 2012). The quality of principal leadership is also 
possibly correlated with Q Comp participation. This is because schools’ participation in  
Q Comp is based on the agreement of teachers (MOLA, 2009). Considering that sharing a 
vision with members, and leading them to achieve the vision are components of a good 
leader (Leithwood & Louis, 2012), the quality of principal leadership could be correlated 
with the Q Comp participation of schools. If so, this unobserved variable, the quality of 
leadership, would be correlated with Q Comp participation, a key independent variable of 
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this study, and dependent variables, teacher retention rate and student achievement. Not 
considering the variable in the analysis model, the coefficient of the Q Comp 
participation would be biased (Cook, 2002). However, data on leadership quality, and 
changes therein, were difficult to observe for the years examined, so this study did not 
include it in the analytical model. 
Addressing Selection Bias: School Fixed Effects (Within Model) 
To control for unobserved compounding variables, this study considers school 
fixed effects. School fixed effects are considered by using school-mean-deviation scores 
rather than raw scores of dependent and independent variables (Allison, 2009).  
School-mean-deviation scores refer here to scores extracted by the mean score of 
each school. For example, let us consider the school-mean-deviation score of teacher 
retention rates. Each school has raw data of teacher retention rate across eight time points 
(from 2002–03 to 2009–10) in the data of this study. Each school has its mean score of 
the eight time points’ raw scores. The mean score can be called school-mean-teacher-
retention rate. If a raw score of a school in a year are subtracted by its school-mean-
teacher-retention rate, the result refers here to the school-mean-deviation score of the 
school in that year.  
In this way, all dependent and independent variables were transformed into the 
school-mean-deviation scores and used in the analyses. In practice, this study used plm 
package in R (Croissant et al., 2013) rather than constructing the deviation scores and 
then analyzing them. By the argument, model=”within”, the plm function of the package 
automatically produced school-mean-deviation scores and then used them to estimate 
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coefficients.  
Year Fixed Effects 
In addition to school fixed effects, this study also considered year fixed effects 
controlling for year-specific characteristics in teacher retention rate and student 
achievement. For example, considering teacher retention rates are more likely to be high 
when the economic condition is bad (Hanushek et al., 2004; Reichardt & Buhler, 2002), 
the nationwide economic recession after 2008 might be associated with higher teacher 
retention rates. Also, the version change of MCA as mentioned in the previous section 
could be related to student achievement. 
Comparison of models with and without year fixed effects by F test was 
employed to evaluate the need of year fixed effects term. The pFtest function in the plm 
package in R (Croissant et al., 2013) was used to do the comparison. Comparison of the 
models show that models with year fixed effects terms were significantly different from 
models without year fixed effects terms (F(7, 10966) = 6.2083, p < .001 for the retention 
model on research questions (1) and (4a), F(7, 10918) = 5.8987, p < .001 for the retention 
model about research questions (2) and (4b), F(7, 5790) = 136.4683, p < .001 in math 
achievement model, and F(7, 5802) = 67.738, p < .001 in reading achievement model 
about research questions (3) and (4c)). Based on these results, this study included year 
fixed effects term in the models to control for year-specific differences across years.  
Variability of Coefficient of Q comp Variable 
This study examined the variability of coefficient of Q Comp variable, whether or 
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not the effect of Q Comp could vary across schools. That is, by adopting a random effect 
on the coefficient to build a linear mixed model (LMM; Long, 2011), this study examined 
the possibility of that variation. 
Comparison of models with and without the random effect term by ANOVA test 
was also employed to evaluate the possibility. The lmer function  in lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, & Bolker, 2013) and anova function in R was used to do this. The result was 
  (2) ≈ 0, p ≈ 1 for all models. It showed that including the random effect would not 
make a difference, which could be interpreted that it would not be needed. Therefore, this 
study did not consider the variability of the coefficient of the Q Comp variable. 
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation means “correlation between members of a series of observations 
ordered in time” (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008, p. 452), which could happen in analysis of 
panel data. Because autocorrelation would affect estimation of standard errors of 
estimated coefficients in the analysis, the significance test for coefficients would be 
problematic (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008). To address this problem, after analysis of each 
model, this study tested the possibility of autocorrelation by the Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge test, using the pbgtest function in the plm package of R (Croissant et 
al., 2013). When autocorrelation was detected,  this study adopted the Newey-West 
method to correct standard errors, which is “known as HAC (heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent) standard errors” (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008, p. 494). Even 
though this method is known to be inappropriate for small samples, this study included a 
large number of schools so it was appropriate to use this method. The coeftest function 
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with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the lmtest package in R was used to correct 
standard errors, which is known to be appropriate for fixed effects model (Croissant & 
Millo, 2008). 
Bias from Inclusion of Non-Q Comp Schools 
The current study included data from non-Q Comp schools, together with pre-
intervention data from Q Comp schools, to estimate the level of Q Comp school 
performance prior to the implementation of Q Comp. An alternative strategy would have 
relied entirely on the pre-intervention data from Q Comp schools to estimate the level of 
Q Comp school performance prior to the implementation of Q Comp. The alternative 
approach would use each Q Comp school as its own matched control and may be 
considered preferable because this form of matching ensures that the treatment and 
control schools are matched on unobserved covariates as well as observed covariates. In 
comparison, the non-Q Comp schools may differ from the Q Comp schools along 
unobserved covariates. In comparison to the alternative strategy, the strategy employed in 
the current study may produce biased estimates. The direction of bias is unknown and 
suggests caution in interpreting the estimates of Q Comp effects (see Appendix for more 
discussion of this issue). 
Equations for Analysis 
Based on the discussion above, the equation for the teacher retention model is as 
follows: 
   
         
       
             
     
      (1) 
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In the model and hereafter, the asterisk marks indicated that the variable was 
transformed into school-mean-deviation score. The deviation score of the teacher 
retention rate of school s in school year t,    
 , was a function of year fixed effects,   , 
deviation scores of aggregated teacher characteristics,    
 , working condition of school, 
    
 , and Q Comp implementation,           
 . Regarding research question (1), this 
study is interested in the coefficient matrix of  , whether it was significantly positive or 
not. If the Q Comp variable was considered, the   was a 1×1 matrix, which represented 
the difference between Q Comp and non-Q Comp schools. When the Q Comp variable 
was considered in terms of length of implementation, the   was a 1×5 matrix, which 
estimated the difference between non-Q Comp schools and first, second, third, fourth, 
and fifth year of implementation, respectively. 
The equation for research question (2) was similar to equation (1), as indicated 
below: 
      
         
       
             
     
     (2) 
The only difference was the dependent variable. The deviation score of 
experienced teacher retention rate of school s in school year t,       
 , was used here, and 
the research focus was also on the coefficient matrix of  , whether it was significantly 
positive or not.  
Below is the equation for the student achievement model: 
   
          
             
     
       (3) 
The dependent variable was the deviation score on rate of students who were on 
or above the proficiency level of school s in school year t. It was regressed on year fixed 
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effects,   , deviation scores of aggregated school characteristics,      
  and Q Comp 
implementation,           
 . The research focus was also on the coefficient matrix,  . 
For the research question (4), one additional variable of school type was added in 
the equation (1) ~ (3). School type was a time-invariant variable so its transformation into 
school-mean-deviation scores makes the value of all schools zero. Therefore, as Allison 
(2009) recommended, the difference between charter schools and traditional public 
schools in the dependent variables were represented by the interaction terms of year fixed 
effects and charter school,                 . The interaction of Q Comp and charter 
school,                         
 , indicated the charter school-specific Q Comp effect. 
 
   
         
       
                               
  
                          
     
      (4a) 
      
         
       
                               
  
                          
     
      (4b) 
   
          
                               
  
                          
     
      (4c) 
 
According to research questions (4a) ~ (4c), the coefficient matrix of   as well as 
  were estimates of interest. The   represented whether or not a charter school-specific 
effect of Q Comp existed when compared to that of a traditional school. When the Q 
Comp variable was considered in terms of length of implementation, the   indicated an 
effect of Q Comp on charter schools with a given years of Q Comp implementation when 
compared to the other schools. 
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Data Sources 
This study will use data mainly from the website of the Minnesota Department of 
Education (MDE, http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/index.html). Teacher-level data, 
which are used in identifying site information of each teacher in each school year, were 
from the database of the Pioneer Press (hereafter, it is called MDE-P, 
http://extra.twincities.com/car/schoolsalaries/default.aspx). It has posted information on 
assigned school and subjects and amount of salary of licensed educators in Minnesota 
public schools. The source of the Pioneer Press database was constructed from 
“MDEDATAB Assignment, AssignDesc and OrgUnit tables” (Minnesota Department of 
Education, n.d.-j) and “MDEDATAB Employment and OrgUnit tables” (Minnesota 
Department of Education, n.d.-k) of the Minnesota Department of Education. The data 
represented the status as of October 1st of every school year. A summary of variables and 
their data sources is provided in Table III-5. 
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< Table III- 5 > Variables and Data Sources of This Study 
Variables Data Sources Data Description 
Retention rates of school  Calculated by Author with MDE-P data Portion of teachers staying in the school from the 
previous year to a given year (Continuous variable) 
Retention rates of experienced 
teachers in school  
Calculated by Author with MDE-P data Portion of experienced teachers staying in the school 
from the previous year to a given year (Continuous 
variable) 
Schools’ portion of student who 
met or exceeded standard in 3rd 
Math MCA  
MCA result files from the MDE website Portion of students who was at level 2b, 3, or 4 in 3rd 
grade Math MCA or at level 3 or 4 in 3rd grade Math 
MCA-II test (Continuous variable) 
Schools’ portions of student 
who met or exceeded standard 
in 3rd Reading MCA test  
MCA result files from the MDE website Portion of students who was at level 2b, 3, or 4 in 3rd 
grade Reading MCA or at level 3 or 4 in 3rd grade 
Reading MCA-II (Continuous variable) 
Teachers’ average age of school  Teacher Demographics files (Continuous variable) 
Proportion of female teachers  Teacher Demographics files Female teacher FTE (full-time equivalent) over the total 
teacher FTE (Continuous variable) 
Proportion of teachers with 
teaching experiences of: 
Teacher Demographics files (Continuous variable) 
     5-9 years  Portion of teachers with 5-9 years teaching experience 
     10-29 years  Portion of teachers with 10-29 years teaching experience 
     30 or more years  Portion of teachers with 30 or more years teaching 
experience 
(Continued) 
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 (Continued)  
Variables Data Sources Data Description 
Proportion of minority students Student Enrollment by gender and 
ethnicity files 
Number of non-white students over total students 
(Continuous variable) 
Proportion of low income 
students 
Student Enrollment by special 
populations files 
Number of students receiving Free or Reduced Price 
Lunch program over total students (Continuous variable) 
Student-teacher ratio Teacher Demographics files, Student 
Enrollment by special populations 
files 
Number of total students over total teacher FTE 
(Continuous variable) 
Number of enrolled students Student Enrollment by gender and 
ethnicity files 
Number of total students enrolled in a given school 
(Continuous variable) 
School Type (Charter school or 
not) 
Student Enrollment by gender and 
ethnicity files 
Binary variable (1 for schools with district type code 7, 0 
otherwise) 
Unemployment rate of 
community 
Website of Minnesota Department of 
Employment and Economic 
Development 
(Continuous variable) 
Q Comp participating schools Q Comp Revenue files from the MDE 
website 
Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp in a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
Duration of Q Comp: Q Comp Revenue files from the MDE 
website 
 
     1 Year of Q Comp  Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp for 1 year including a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
     2 Years of Q Comp  Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp for 2 years including a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
     3 Years of Q Comp  Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp for 3 years including a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
     4 Years of Q Comp  Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp for 4 years including a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
     5 Years of Q Comp  Binary variable (1 if the school was implementing Q 
Comp for 5 years including a given year, and 0, otherwise) 
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MDE-P Data and Overall Retention Rate of Teachers 
The overall retention rate of teachers was calculated by the author based on 
information from the MDE-P data. Those data files listed all licensed staff in Minnesota 
public schools with their identification number and information on which school they 
worked in and which subjects they taught in every year. Based on the information, this 
study identified the number of teachers who taught core subjects (by school and by 
school year, from 2002–03 to 2009–10. Then, by a comparison with the next school 
year’s teacher list, this study identified teachers who stayed in their schools in the next 
school year (stayers) and the number of stayers in each school, from 2003–04 to 2010–
11. This identification made it possible to calculate retention rates across schools and 
time. For example, the 2003 retention rate of a given school was the number of teachers 
who were assigned in the given school in the 2003–04 school year list out of the teachers 
who were assigned in the school in the 2002–03 school year. The retention rates of 
experienced teachers were calculated by the same process for the different group of 
teachers, teachers with three or more years of experience. 
Other Data Sources 
An important dependent variable of this study is the results of the Minnesota 
Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) exams. Annual MCA result reports were posted on 
the MDE website. The reports contained information on the number of students who took 
the exam and the number of students in each proficiency level (MCA grouped students by 
five levels and MCA-II by four levels). This information allowed this study to calculate 
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the percentage of third grade students who met or exceeded mathematics or reading 
standards at the school level. 
The MDE publicized files annually on teacher demographics aggregated at the 
school level on its website (http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/index.html). Those files 
included information on average teacher age, the number of teachers full time equivalent 
(teacher FTE), female teacher FTE, and the number of teachers by teaching experiences 
of 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30 years or more. This study used the 
information to get the average teacher age, the portion of female teachers, and the portion 
of teachers with teaching experiences of 5-9, 10-29, and 30 years or more.  
Not only teacher demographics, but also information on student demographics at 
the school level was posted on the MDE website. Those files provided information on the 
percentage of minority students, the percentage of free or reduced lunch price recipients, 
and the total number of students enrolled in a given school. The teacher demographic and 
student enrollment files in the MDE website were also used to calculate the student-
teacher ratio.  
This study measured the economic condition of communities using the 
unemployment rates of the economic development region in which the schools are 
located. The unemployment rate data were available on the website of the Minnesota 
Department of Employment and Economic Development 
(http://www.positivelyminnesota.com/apps/lmi/laus/). 
Annual reports of Q Comp revenue on the MDE website from fiscal year 2006 to 
2010 gave information on schools that received Q Comp revenue in an academic year. 
Based on the information, this study identified whether or not a school implements Q 
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Comp in an academic year. A possible problematic case would be schools that are listed 
in school districts reported as Q Comp districts in an academic year but are not listed in 
the Q Comp revenue reports. This study assumed that if schools did not receive Q Comp 
revenue, they could not implement Q Comp appropriately. Districts, however, could 
support Q Comp implementation in those schools. Therefore, this study considered all 
schools within school districts that were reported to be Q Comp districts in an academic 
year as Q Comp schools in that year. Exceptions were Minneapolis public schools and 
Roseville public schools. Those districts are not permitted to have district-wide Q Comp 
plans but may contain individual school-wide plans. Therefore, schools in Minneapolis 
and Roseville school districts were considered as Q Comp schools only when they were 
listed in the Q Comp revenue reports. 
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CHAPTER IV: EFFECT ON TEACHER RETENTION RATE 
This chapter reports the finding from the analyses of the teacher retention model 
and consists of two sections: The first section is on overall teacher retention rate, and the 
second is on retention rate of experienced teachers. The first section gives answers to 
research question (1), the Q Comp effect on overall teacher retention rate, and (4a), the Q 
Comp effect on overall teacher retention rate that is distinctive in charter schools. The 
second section is about research question (2), the Q Comp effect on retention rate of 
experienced teachers, and research question (4b), the Q Comp effect on retention rate of 
experienced teachers specific to charter schools. 
Overall Teacher Retention Rate of Minnesota Schools 
The analysis includes 12,708 cases that consist of 1,734 schools for eight years, 
from 2003 to 2010. For the research period, the annual average teacher retention rates 
were stable around 0.84, with a low of 0.83 in 2006 and 2007 and a high of 0.86 in 2004, 
2009, and 2010 (See Table IV-1(a)). After transforming retention rates to the school-
mean-deviation scores by subtracting each school’s average over time, which is the 
dependent variable actually used after controlling for school fixed effects (Croissant & 
Millo, 2008), the annual means moved around 0.00 from -0.01 to 0.01, but the trend 
looked similar (See Table IV-1(b)). That is, it decreased to -0.01 in 2006 and 2007 but 
increased to 0.01 in 2009 and 2010. 
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< Table IV- 1 > Trend in Overall Teacher Retention Rates of Minnesota Schools: 2003–
2010 
   
(a) Retention Rates  (b) School Mean Deviation Scores 
Year N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
2003 1,556  0.84 0.14  0.00 0.11 
2004 1,585  0.85 0.13  0.00 0.10 
2005 1,583  0.84 0.14  0.00 0.11 
2006 1,587  0.83 0.15  -0.01 0.11 
2007 1,606  0.83 0.14  -0.01 0.11 
2008 1,625  0.84 0.15  0.00 0.11 
2009 1,599  0.85 0.13  0.01 0.11 
2010 1,567  0.86 0.13  0.01 0.11 
Total 12,708  0.84 0.14  0.00 0.11 
 
The distribution of the teacher retention rates across cases was different from the 
normal distribution, negatively skewed, and the frequency was inflated around 1.0 (See 
Figure IV-1 (a)). Because this study used a fixed effects model by plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013), the dependent variable was subtracted by the school’s average 
over time in the actual analysis (Croissant & Millo, 2008). This time-process made the 
distribution of the dependent variable similar to the normal distribution (See Figure IV-
1(b) and 1(c)). According to quantile-quantile plot (Q-Q plot, see Figure IV-1(d)), 
however, it seemed to be a heavy-tailed distribution rather than the normal distribution, 
which has more observations in two sides than the normal curve. The violation of 
normality assumption in regression does not prevent the estimation of unbiased 
coefficients. It, however, is related with estimating standard errors for the coefficients, 
which would make t-test on coefficients problematic in small samples (Gujarati & 
Sangeetha, 2008, pp. 346–347). This analysis, however, was with a large sample (N = 
12,708), which would make this violation not very problematic. 
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(a) Teacher Retention Rate of MN Schools 
(b) Teacher Retention Rate of MN Schools 
(School-Mean-Deviated) 
  
  
(c) Density Plot for Teacher Retention Rate 
of MN Schools (School-Mean-
Deviated) 
(d) Q-Q Plot for Teacher Retention Rate of 
MN Schools (School-Mean-Deviated) 
Note. Figures were generated by the sm package (Bowman & Azzalini, 2014) and the 
car package (Fox et al., 2014) in the software R 
 
[ Figure IV- 1 ] Distribution of Overall Teacher Retention Rate across Schools 
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Correlation Analysis 
This study performed two correlation analyses for the variables considered with 
values before and after transforming into school-mean-deviation scores (See Table IV-2 
and IV-3). In the result with values before the transformation, the retention rate was 
significantly but not strongly correlated with the characteristics of teacher composition. It 
was positively correlated with the average age of teachers (R= 0.11, p < 0.01) and the rate 
of experienced teachers (R= 0.06, p < 0.01 for 5 to 9 years of experience, R= 0.17, p < 
0.01 for 10 to 29 years of experience, and R= 0.14, p < 0.01 for 30 and more years of 
experience). On the other hand, it was negatively correlated with the percentage of 
female teachers (R= -0.03, p < 0.05).  
The retention rate was also correlated with school characteristics representing 
teachers working conditions. That is, it was negatively correlated with percentage of 
minority students (R= -0.24, p < 0.01) and FRL students (R= -0.18, p < 0.01). It was, 
however, positively correlated with student-teacher ratio (R= 0.02, p < 0.05)
4
, which is 
the opposite direction from what this study expected.  
 
                                                 
 
4
 The correlation coefficient is too little to be considered practically important in spite of its statistical 
significance. However, the direction was opposite from what this study expected so that this study 
described this relationship more fully. 
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< Table IV- 2 > Correlation Matrix of Variables in Overall Teacher Retention Rate Analysis 
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Average Teacher Age 41.26 4.01 0.11 **           
Female Teacher Rate 0.73 0.17 -0.03 ** 0.08 **         
Rate of teachers with               
5-9 years of 
experience 6.72 6.03 0.06 ** -0.27 ** -0.13 **       
10-29 years of 
experience 14.95 11.26 0.17 ** 0.10 ** -0.10 ** 0.63 **     
30 + years of 
experience 3.30 3.23 0.14 ** 0.27 ** -0.12 ** 0.34 ** 0.53 **   
Student-Teacher 
Ratio 16.00 6.90 0.02 * 0.01 0.00 0.11 ** 0.15 ** 0.10 ** 
Minority Student Rate 0.22 0.26 -0.24 ** -0.10 ** 0.13 ** 0.15 ** -0.02 -0.19 ** 
FRL Student Rate 0.36 0.23 -0.18 ** 0.07 ** 0.09 ** -0.14 ** -0.24 ** -0.24 ** 
#Enrollment 503.02 411.38 0.12 ** -0.08 ** -0.16 ** 0.81 ** 0.90 ** 0.59 ** 
Unemployment Rate 5.19 1.54 0.09 ** 0.07 ** -0.04 ** -0.15 ** -0.03 * -0.07 ** 
School Type
+
 0.08 0.27 -0.27 ** -0.36 ** -0.04 ** -0.17 ** -0.34 ** -0.29 ** 
Q Comp
+
 0.10 0.30 -0.01 -0.09 ** 0.08 ** 0.12 ** 0.17 ** -0.02 
(Continued) 
   77 
(Continued) 
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Average Teacher Age             
Female Teacher Rate             
Rate of teachers with             
5-9 years of 
experience             
10-29 years of 
experience             
30 + years of 
experience             
Student-Teacher 
Ratio             
Minority Student Rate -0.03 **           
FRL Student Rate -0.20 ** 0.73 **         
#Enrollment 0.23 ** -0.01 -0.30 **       
Unemployment Rate -0.06 ** -0.08 ** 0.16 ** -0.09 **     
School Type
+
 -0.01 0.28 ** 0.24 ** -0.24 ** -0.03 **   
Q Comp
+
 0.04 ** 0.08 ** -0.05 ** 0.16 ** 0.06 ** 0.02 * 
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This Pearson correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
Because school type and Q Comp (
+ 
marked) were nominal variables, point-biserial correlation coefficients were calculated 
for them, which were calculated by biserial.cor function of the ltm package in R (Rizopoulos, 2013). 
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The opposite direction could be interpreted with other correlation coefficients. 
The student-teacher ratio was negatively correlated with percentage of minority students 
or free or reduced lunch program eligible students. Because the variables were also 
correlated with teacher retention rates, those associations could confound the relationship 
between the student-teacher ratio and teacher retention rates, which would result in 
associations between the variables being in the opposite direction from what was 
expected. 
Further, the retention rate was negatively correlated with school type, a key 
variable related to the research question (R= -0.27, p < 0.01). As reported in previous 
studies, Minnesota charter schools seem to face more difficulty in retaining their teachers 
than traditional public schools. Minnesota charter schools also showed a lower average 
age of teachers and have higher portions of less experienced teachers. Moreover, they 
seemed to serve a higher percentage of minority and low-income students, which suggest 
that charter schools may have working conditions characterized by the literature as 
difficult. In turn, these more challenging conditions may make it more likely that teachers 
leave the school. 
Finally, the retention rate was not significantly correlated with Q Comp 
implementation or the length of Q Comp implementation, which is a main concern of this 
study. Moreover, the direction of the correlations between the retention rates and Q 
Comp were negative, which was the opposite from the expectation of this study.  
However, considering school fixed effects affected correlations among the 
variables. After transforming all variables to deviation scores, this study examined 
correlations among the transformed variables again (Compare Table IV-3 to IV-2).  
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< Table IV- 3 > Correlation Matrix of deviation-scored Variables in Overall Teacher Retention Rate Analysis 
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Average Teacher Age 0.00 1.87 -0.03 **           
Female Teacher Rate 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00         
Rate of teachers with               
5-9 years of 
experience 0.00 2.28 -0.02 * -0.17 ** -0.02 *       
10-29 years of 
experience 0.00 2.59 -0.01 0.12 ** 0.02 * -0.33 **     
30 + years of 
experience 0.00 1.51 -0.05 ** 0.21 ** -0.09 ** 0.08 ** -0.12 **   
Student-Teacher 
Ratio 0.00 5.01 0.05 ** 0.09 ** 0.01 -0.04 ** -0.05 ** 0.00 
Minority Student Rate 0.00 0.04 0.02 * -0.01 0.06 ** -0.15 ** 0.16 ** -0.28 ** 
FRL Student Rate 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 ** -0.14 ** 0.12 ** -0.27 ** 
#Enrollment 0.00 51.29 -0.02 -0.07 ** -0.04 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** 0.21 ** 
Unemployment Rate 0.00 1.20 0.05 ** -0.03 ** 0.09 ** -0.17 ** 0.22 ** -0.24 ** 
School Type
+
 NA NA NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Q Comp
+
 0.00 0.23 0.02 * -0.01 0.07 ** -0.13 ** 0.18 ** -0.18 ** 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
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Average Teacher Age             
Female Teacher Rate             
Rate of teachers with             
5-9 years of 
experience             
10-29 years of 
experience             
30 + years of 
experience             
Student-Teacher Ratio             
Minority Student Rate -0.03 **           
FRL Student Rate -0.05 ** 0.55 **         
#Enrollment 0.06 ** -0.08 ** -0.10 **       
Unemployment Rate -0.03 ** 0.25 ** 0.37 ** -0.05 **     
School Type
+
 NA  NA  NA  NA  NA   
Q Comp
+
 -0.02 * 0.31 ** 0.22 ** 0.00 0.18 ** NA  
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This Pearson correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
School Type (
+ 
marked) was a time-invariant characteristic of school so it was excluded from this correlation analysis. 
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The transformation resulted in many correlations becoming weaker and not 
statistically significant. For example, the retention rate deviation score was no longer 
associated significantly with percentage of female teachers, percentage of FRL students, 
and number of enrolled students. On the other hand, it became significantly correlated 
with Q Comp implementation even though the size of the correlation is very weak (R= 
0.02, p < 0.05). 
The correlation analysis showed that Q Comp was related to the within-school 
changes in the retention rate of teachers even though the relationship was not strong. 
Because Q Comp was correlated with some of the other independent variables that were 
also associated with the retention rate, multiple regression analysis with consideration of 
school and year fixed effects was employed to examine the relationship of Q Comp with 
the retention rate after controlling for the other variables. The results are presented in the 
next section. 
One more interesting correlation is that of Q Comp with school type before the 
data was transformed (Because school type is a time-invariant variable, we cannot 
calculate it after transformation).  The association was weak but statistically significant 
before-transformation analysis (See Table IV-2, R= 0.02, p < 0.05). It could be 
interpreted that charter schools would be more likely to participate in Q Comp. 
Overall, the sizes of correlation coefficients were small — only a few correlation 
coefficients were bigger than 0.3. Specifically, the correlation coefficients related with 
teacher retention rates became smaller after the school-mean-deviation score 
transformation. This implies that variables considered in this study could explain the 
between school differences in the retention rate better than within school differences. This 
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distinction is discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
Effect of Q Comp on Teacher Retention Rate 
As stated in the Chapter 3, this study examined the effect of Q Comp on teacher 
retention rate. The Q Comp implementation was considered as a binary variable (Yes = 1, 
No = 0, Table IV-4(A)). It also included the year fixed effects term because a model 
comparison between with and without the year fixed effects term meant that including the 
term would be more valid (F(7, 10966) = 6.2083, p < 0.001). Contrary to the correlation 
analysis, the association of changes in the teacher retention rate with Q Comp 
implementation was not significant (b = 0.0072, s.e. = 0.0050, t = 1.4404, p > 0.10).  
It might take time for schools to enjoy the effect of Q Comp on the teacher 
retention rate. When the analysis considered the length of implementation of this study 
(See Table IV-4(B)), the Q Comp effect was not significant until the fifth implementation 
year (b = 0.0632, s.e. = 0.0148, t = 4.2817, p < 0.01). It could be interpreted that schools 
implementing Q Comp for five years would be higher in teacher retention rate by 6.32- 
percentage points than the other schools that did not have 5 years of Q Comp 
implementation when the other conditions are the same. 
One more interesting finding is that the R
2
 was very small (R
2
Model A = 0.0124 and 
R
2
Model B = 0.0135). It can be interpreted that this model would explain only around 1% of 
the within-school variations of teacher retention rate. This is a limitation of this study, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this study. 
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< Table IV- 4 > Result of Analysis on Overall Teacher Retention Rate Model 
 (A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate        S.E. 
Year 2004 0.0013  0.0042  0.0014  0.0042 
Year 2005 -0.0050  0.0048  -0.0050  0.0048 
Year 2006 -0.0130 * 0.0054  -0.0131 * 0.0055 
Year 2007 -0.0184 ** 0.0055  -0.0185 ** 0.0055 
Year 2008 -0.0132 * 0.0058  -0.0134 * 0.0059 
Year 2009 0.0040  0.0063  0.0041  0.0064 
Year 2010 0.0036  0.0122  0.0038  0.0122 
Average Teacher Age -0.0007  0.0011  -0.0007  0.0011 
Female Teacher Rate -0.0203  0.0429  -0.0206  0.0428 
Rate of teachers with        
5-9 experiences -0.0013 * 0.0005  -0.0013 ** 0.0005 
10-29 experiences -0.0019 ** 0.0006  -0.0020 ** 0.0006 
30 + experiences -0.0045 ** 0.0009  -0.0045 ** 0.0009 
S-T Ratio 0.0011 ** 0.0004  0.0011 ** 0.0004 
Minority Student Rate 0.0869  0.0554  0.0884  0.0556 
FRL Student Rate -0.0862  0.0458  -0.0882 . 0.0458 
#Enrollment 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Unemployment Rate  0.0007  0.0030  0.0006  0.0030 
Q Comp 0.0072  0.0050     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0076  0.0062 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0081  0.0069 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0092  0.0075 
4 Years Q Comp     -0.0058  0.0091 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0632 ** 0.0148 
        
R
2
 0.0124    0.0135   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 104.8374, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 103.6093, p < 0.01) 
for the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-West method using the 
coeftest function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the lmtest package of R.  
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Effect of Q Comp in Charter Schools 
In the next step, this study added the interaction effect terms of time and school 
type as well as Q Comp implementation and school type. This is to get answers for the 
research question 4(a), the distinctive effect of Q Comp on teacher retention rates in 
charter schools.  
Firstly, charter schools had significantly higher teacher retention rates in 2009 (b= 
0.1153, s.e. = 0.0371, t = 3.1122, p < 0.01) and 2010 (b= 0.1122, s.e. = 0.0378, t = 
2.9717, p < 0.01) than traditional public schools (See Table IV-5(A)). As seen in the 
correlation analysis summarized in Table IV-2, Minnesota charter schools have been 
challenged with a lower teacher retention rate than traditional schools. When other 
conditions were the same, however, Minnesota charter schools had higher teacher 
retention rates in 2009 and 2010 than non-charter schools, which was positive sign for 
charter schools. We discussed this topic more fully in Chapter 6. 
Secondly, Q Comp implementation was not significantly associated with teacher 
retention rate in traditional schools (b = 0.0081, s.e. = 0.0049, t = 1.6312, p > 0.10) or in 
charter schools (for Q Comp: School Type (Charter) term, b = -0.0233, s.e. = 0.0270, t = -
0.8618, p > 0.10). This result of no significant association is consistent with the result of 
the previous analysis summarized in Table IV-4(A). 
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 < Table IV- 5 > Result of Analysis on Overall Teacher Retention Rate Model: School 
Type Focused 
 (A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
Year 2004 -0.0015  0.0040  -0.0015  0.0040 
Year 2005 -0.0079  0.0044  -0.0078  0.0044 
Year 2006 -0.0168 ** 0.0051  -0.0167 ** 0.0051 
Year 2007 -0.0210 ** 0.0052  -0.0212 ** 0.0053 
Year 2008 -0.0162 ** 0.0054  -0.0157 ** 0.0054 
Year 2009 -0.0042  0.0060  -0.0037  0.0060 
Year 2010 -0.0043  0.0121  -0.0046  0.0121 
Average Teacher Age -0.0008  0.0012  -0.0008  0.0012 
Female Teacher Rate -0.0194  0.0419  -0.0207  0.0419 
Rate of teachers with        
5-9 experiences -0.0015 ** 0.0005  -0.0015 ** 0.0005 
10-29 experiences -0.0018 ** 0.0006  -0.0018 ** 0.0006 
30 + experiences -0.0049 ** 0.0009  -0.0048 ** 0.0009 
S-T Ratio 0.0011 ** 0.0004  0.0011 ** 0.0004 
Minority Student Rate 0.0913  0.0571  0.0931  0.0575 
FRL Student Rate -0.0906 * 0.0449  -0.0946 * 0.0449 
#Enrollment 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Unemployment Rate 0.0007  0.0030  0.0007  0.0030 
Year 2004:School Type (Charter) 0.0590  0.0336  0.0589  0.0337 
Year 2005:School Type (Charter) 0.0601  0.0343  0.0599  0.0343 
Year 2006:School Type (Charter) 0.0698  0.0371  0.0709  0.0371 
Year 2007:School Type (Charter) 0.0584  0.0351  0.0605  0.0353 
Year 2008:School Type (Charter) 0.0631  0.0367  0.0589  0.0368 
Year 2009:School Type (Charter) 0.1153 ** 0.0371  0.1139 ** 0.0370 
Year 2010:School Type (Charter) 0.1122 ** 0.0378  0.1163 ** 0.0384 
Q Comp 0.0081  0.0049     
Q Comp: School Type (Charter) -0.0233  0.0270     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0120 * 0.0054 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0042  0.0069 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0072  0.0074 
4 Years Q Comp     -0.0005  0.0090 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0720 ** 0.0158 
1 Year Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.0532  0.0376 
2 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     0.0230  0.0318 
3 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     0.0064  0.0395 
4 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.0789  0.0480 
5 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.1053 * 0.0486 
        
R
2
 0.0172    0.0194   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R (Croissant et 
al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 102.8335, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 100.6787, p < 0.01) for 
the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-West method using the coeftest 
function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the lmtest package of R.   
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Thirdly, when the Q Comp variable was examined by length of time implemented 
and interactions of year and charter school were considered (See Table IV-5(B)), schools 
with one year of implementation of Q Comp had higher retention rates than the other 
schools (b = 0.0120, s.e. = 0.0054, t = 2.2127, p < 0.05). This is different in Table IV-
4(B) where interactions of year and charter school were not considered. Moreover, on 
average, schools that implemented Q Comp for 5 years had 7.2 percentage points higher 
overall teacher retention rates than the other schools (b= 0.0720, s.e. = 0.0212, t = 3.3917, 
p < 0.01).  
Fourthly, charter schools that implemented Q Comp for 5 years had overall 
teacher retention rates that were 10.5 percentage points lower than other schools (b= -
0.1053, s.e. = 0.0628, t = -1.6756, p > 0.05). This finding is opposite to the expectations 
of this study that charter schools might have more gains from Q Comp because of the 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility. 
Effect of Q Comp on Retention Rate of Experienced Teachers 
The research question (2) of this study is focusing on the retention rate of teachers 
with three or more years of teaching experience. To get an answer for the research 
question, this study calculated retention rate of experienced teachers. The analysis 
includes 12,657 cases, which consist of 1,731 schools for the eight years of the research 
period. Compared to the 12,708 cases that consist of 1,734 schools in the previous 
analysis (about overall teacher retention rate), the case size of this analysis is decreased 
by 51.  
For the research period, the annual retention rates of experienced teachers were 
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stable around 0.86 (See Table IV-6(a)). The overall mean was higher than the overall 
teacher retention rates of 0.84 (Compare to Table IV-1(a)), and annual retention rates 
were lower in 2006 and 2007 and higher in 2009 and 2010 than in the previous years, 
which is similar to the pattern of the overall teacher retention rates. After transformation 
to school-mean-deviation scores, a similar trend appeared. 
 
< Table IV- 6 > Trend in Experienced Teacher Retention Rates of Minnesota Schools: 
2003–2010 
   (a) Retention Rates  (b) School-Mean-Deviation Scores 
Year N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
2003 1,551  0.86 0.14  0.00 0.12 
2004 1,579  0.86 0.14  0.00 0.11 
2005 1,574  0.86 0.14  0.00 0.11 
2006 1,581  0.85 0.15  -0.01 0.11 
2007 1,601  0.85 0.15  -0.01 0.12 
2008 1,618  0.86 0.16  0.00 0.12 
2009 1,590  0.87 0.14  0.01 0.12 
2010 1,563  0.87 0.13  0.01 0.11 
Total 12,657  0.86 0.14  0.00 0.11 
 
The distribution of the retention rate of experienced teachers across cases was 
negatively skewed and the frequency was very high around1.0 (See Figure IV-2 (a)). This 
school-mean-deviation scores dependent variable, however, was close to the normal 
distribution as in the overall teacher retention rate analysis (See Figure IV-2(b) and 2(c)). 
According to quantile-quantile plot (Q-Q plot, see Figure IV-2 (d)), however, it seemed 
to be a heavy-tailed distribution, which is similar to the distribution of overall teacher 
retention rate. Because this analysis employed a large sample (N = 12,657), this violation 
was not highly problematic (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008). 
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(a) Experienced Teacher Retention Rate of 
MN Schools 
(b) Experienced Teacher Retention Rate of 
MN Schools (School-Mean-Deviated) 
  
  
(c) Density Plot for Experienced Teacher 
Retention Rate of MN Schools (School-
Mean-Deviated) 
(d) Q-Q plot for Experienced Teacher 
Retention Rate of MN Schools (School-
Mean-Deviated) 
Note. Figures were generated by the sm package (Bowman & Azzalini, 2014) and the 
car package (Fox et al., 2014) in the software R 
 
 [ Figure IV- 2 ] Distribution of Experienced Teacher Retention Rate Across Schools 
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Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis showed that the retention rate of experienced teachers 
was significantly but weakly correlated with school characteristics (See Table IV-7). It 
was positively correlated with the average age of teachers (R = 0.06, p < 0.01) and rate of 
experienced teachers (R= 0.05, p < 0.01 for 5 to 9 years of experience, R= 0.15, p < 0.01 
for 10 to 29 years of experience, and R= 0.12, p < 0.01 for 30 and more years of 
experiences). It was, however, negatively correlated with percentage of female teachers 
(R = -0.03, p < 0.01), negatively correlated with percentage of minority students (R = -
0.24, p < 0.01) and FRL students (R = -0.18, p < 0.01), and positively correlated with 
number of student enrolled (R = 0.11, p < 0.01) and unemployment rate of the 
community (R = 0.07, p < 0.01). The result is similar to the correlation analysis for 
overall teacher retention rate summarized in Table IV-2. 
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< Table IV- 7 > Correlation Matrix of Variables in Experienced Teacher Retention Rate Analysis 
 
M
ea
n
 
S
.D
. 
R
et
en
ti
o
n
 
R
at
e 
 A
v
er
ag
e 
T
ea
ch
er
 A
g
e
 
 F
em
al
e 
T
ea
ch
er
 R
at
e
 
 5
-9
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
 1
0
-2
9
 y
ea
rs
 
o
f 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
 3
0
 +
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
 
Average Teacher Age 41.454 3.659 0.06 **           
Female Teacher Rate 0.724 0.166 -0.03 ** 0.08 **         
Rate of teachers with               
5-9 years of 
experience 6.73 6.03 0.05 ** -0.27 ** -0.13 **       
10-29 years of 
experience 15.00 11.25 0.15 ** 0.1 ** -0.10 ** 0.63 **     
30 + years of 
experience 3.31 3.23 0.12 ** 0.27 ** -0.12 ** 0.34 ** 0.53 **   
Student-Teacher 
Ratio 15.976 3.277 0.01 0.02 * 0.00 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.11 ** 
Minority Student Rate 0.206 0.243 -0.24 ** -0.10 ** 0.13 ** 0.15 ** -0.02 -0.19 ** 
FRL Student Rate 0.346 0.212 -0.18 ** 0.07 ** 0.09 ** -0.14 ** -0.24 ** -0.24 ** 
#Enrollment 504.2 411.5822 0.11 ** -0.09 ** -0.17 ** 0.81 ** 0.90 ** 0.59 ** 
Unemployment Rate 5.202 1.553 0.07 ** 0.07 ** -0.04 ** -0.15 ** -0.03 ** -0.07 ** 
School Type
+
 0.042 0.200 -0.25 ** -0.36 ** -0.05 ** -0.16 ** -0.33 ** -0.28 ** 
Q Comp
+
 0.106 0.308 0.00 -0.09 ** 0.08 ** 0.12 ** 0.17 ** -0.03 ** 
(continued) 
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Average Teacher Age             
Female Teacher Rate             
Rate of teachers with             
5-9 years of 
experience             
10-29 years of 
experience             
30 + years of 
experience             
Student-Teacher 
Ratio             
Minority Student Rate -0.03 **           
FRL Student Rate -0.21 ** 0.73 **         
#Enrollment 0.24 ** -0.01 -0.30 **       
Unemployment Rate -0.06 ** -0.08 ** 0.16 ** -0.09 **     
School Type
+
 -0.02 0.28 ** 0.24 ** -0.24 ** -0.03 **   
Q Comp
+
 0.04 ** 0.08 ** -0.05 ** 0.16 ** 0.06 ** 0.02 ** 
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This Pearson correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
Because school type and Q Comp (
+ 
marked) were nominal variables, point-biserial correlation coefficients were calculated 
for them, which were calculated by biserial.cor function of the ltm package in R (Rizopoulos, 2013). 
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The retention rate of experienced teachers was also significantly correlated with 
school type (R = -0.25, p < 0.01). It could be interpreted that charter schools would face 
more difficulties in retaining experienced teachers than traditional schools, in the same 
way it is harder for charter schools to retain teachers overall. 
Finally, the retention rate was not significantly correlated with Q Comp 
implementation (R = 0.00, p > 0.10), which is a main concern of this study. Q Comp 
implementation was correlated with other school characteristics that were correlated with 
the retention rate of experienced teachers. After considering school fixed effects, 
however, the correlation became significant and positive, although very weak (R = 0.03, 
p < 0.01, See Table IV-8). 
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< Table IV- 8 > Correlation Matrix of Deviation-Scored Variables in Experienced Teacher Retention Rate Analysis 
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Average Teacher Age 0.00 1.83 -0.10 **           
Female Teacher Rate 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00         
Rate of teachers with               
5-9 years of 
experience 0.00 2.28 -0.02 * -0.17 ** -0.02 *       
10-29 years of 
experience 0.00 2.59 -0.02 0.12 ** 0.02 * -0.33 **     
30 + years of 
experience 0.00 1.51 -0.06 ** 0.22 ** -0.10 ** 0.08 ** -0.12 **   
Student-Teacher 
Ratio 0.00 4.87 0.04 ** 0.10 ** 0.00 -0.04 ** -0.05 ** 0.00 
Minority Student Rate 0.00 0.04 0.02 * -0.01 0.06 ** -0.15 0.16 ** -0.28 ** 
FRL Student Rate 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 ** -0.14 ** 0.12 ** -0.27 ** 
#Enrollment 0.00 51.36 -0.01 -0.07 ** -0.04 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** 0.21 ** 
Unemployment Rate 0.00 1.20 0.05 ** -0.03 ** 0.09 ** -0.17 ** 0.22 ** -0.24 ** 
School Type
+
   NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  
Q Comp
+
 0.00 0.23 0.03 ** -0.01 0.07 ** -0.13 ** 0.18 ** -0.18 ** 
 (continued) 
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Average Teacher Age             
Female Teacher Rate             
Rate of teachers with             
5-9 years of 
experience             
10-29 years of 
experience             
30 + years of 
experience             
Student-Teacher 
Ratio             
Minority Student Rate -0.04 **           
FRL Student Rate -0.06 ** 0.55         
#Enrollment 0.07 ** -0.09 ** -0.10 **       
Unemployment Rate -0.03 ** 0.25 ** 0.37 ** -0.05 **     
School Type
+
 NA  NA  NA  NA  NA    
Q Comp
+
 -0.02 * 0.31 ** 0.22 ** 0.00 0.18 ** NA  
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This Pearson correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
School Type (
+ 
marked) was a time-invariant characteristic of school so it was excluded from this correlation analysis. 
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Effect of Q Comp on Retention Rate of Experienced Teachers 
The result of the analysis of the effect of Q Comp on the retention rate of 
experienced teachers was similar to the results of the overall teacher retention rate model 
(Compare Table IV-9 to Table IV-4). Q Comp was not significantly associated with the 
retention rate of experienced teachers (b = 0.0098, s.e. = 0.0053, t = 1.8425, p > 0.05). 
The Q Comp effect, however, was significant in the fifth implementation year (for five 
years Q Comp in Table IV-9(B), b = 0.0463, s.e. = 0.0144, t = 3.2159, p < 0.01). It could 
be interpreted that schools implementing Q Comp for five years had teacher retention 
rates that were4.63 percentage points higher than the other schools when the other 
conditions are the same. Even though the size of the coefficient is smaller than it is in the 
overall teacher retention rate analysis (Compare b= 0.0463 in Table IV-9 to b= 0.0632 in 
Table IV-4), Q Comp had an effect on retaining experienced teachers. 
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< Table IV- 9 > Result of Analysis on Retention Rate of Experienced Teacher Model 
 (A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
Year 2004 -0.0014  0.0045  -0.0014  0.0045 
Year 2005 -0.0065  0.0048  -0.0065  0.0048 
Year 2006 -0.0187 ** 0.0055  -0.0187 ** 0.0055 
Year 2007 -0.0231 ** 0.0056  -0.0232 ** 0.0056 
Year 2008 -0.0141 * 0.0059  -0.0142 * 0.0059 
Year 2009 0.0025  0.0067  0.0025  0.0067 
Year 2010 -0.0009  0.0130  -0.0007  0.0129 
Average Teacher Age -0.0051 ** 0.0010  -0.0051 ** 0.0010 
Female Teacher Rate 0.0203  0.0427  0.0202  0.0427 
Rate of teachers with        
5-9 experiences -0.0025 ** 0.0006  -0.0025 ** 0.0006 
10-29 experiences -0.0025 ** 0.0005  -0.0025 ** 0.0005 
30 + experiences -0.0050 ** 0.0009  -0.0050 ** 0.0009 
S-T Ratio 0.0009 ** 0.0003  0.0009 ** 0.0003 
Minority Student Rate 0.0436  0.0581  0.0448  0.0583 
FRL Student Rate -0.0401  0.0504  -0.0414  0.0504 
#Enrollment 0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
Unemployment Rate -0.0005  0.0032  -0.0005  0.0032 
Q Comp 0.0098  0.0053     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0104  0.0069 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0098  0.0071 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0121  0.0084 
4 Years Q Comp     0.0004  0.0091 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0463 ** 0.0144 
        
R
2
 0.0204    0.0208   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 120.1686, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 119.8321, p < 0.01) 
for the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-West method using the 
coeftest function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the lmtest package of R. 
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Effect of Q Comp in Charter Schools 
This study added the interaction effect terms of time and school type as well as Q 
Comp implementation and school type. This is to get answers for the research question 
4(b), the distinctive effect of Q Comp on retention rates of experienced teachers in 
charter schools. The main results described below are very similar to the results of the 
overall teacher retention rate in the previous section. 
Firstly, charter schools in 2009 had retention rates of experienced teachers that 
were 10.18 percentage points higher than  the other schools included in the analysis (See 
Table IV-10, b = 0.1018, s.e. = 0.0197, t = 5.1594, p < 0.01).  Charter schools in 2010 
also showed significant differences in the retention rates of experienced teachers, 
compared to the other schools (b = 0.0957, s.e. = 0.0200, t = 4.7821, p < 0.01). 
Secondly, Q Comp implementation was not significantly associated with the 
retention rate of experienced teachers (b = 0.0085, s.e. = 0.0050, t = 1.7161, p > 0.05) and 
had no specific effect in charter schools (b = -0.0007, s.e. = 0.0340, t = -0.0215, p > 
0.05). This is consistent with the result of the overall teacher retention rate analysis seen 
in Table IV-5(A). 
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< Table IV- 10 > Result of Analysis on Retention Rate of Experienced Teachers Model: 
School Type Focused 
 (A) Q Comp -Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate     s.e.  Estimate         s.e. 
Year 2004 -0.0034  0.0041  -0.0033  0.0041 
Year 2005 -0.0093 * 0.0045  -0.0092 * 0.0045 
Year 2006 -0.0188 *** 0.0052  -0.0188 *** 0.0052 
Year 2007 -0.0241 *** 0.0053  -0.0243 *** 0.0054 
Year 2008 -0.0168 ** 0.0055  -0.0165 ** 0.0055 
Year 2009 -0.0053  0.0063  -0.0048  0.0063 
Year 2010 -0.0077  0.0127  -0.0081  0.0127 
Average Teacher Age -0.0053 *** 0.0011  -0.0053 *** 0.0011 
Female Teacher Rate 0.0175  0.0415  0.0170  0.0415 
Rate of teachers with        
5-9 experiences -0.0027 *** 0.0006  -0.0027 *** 0.0006 
10-29 experiences -0.0024 *** 0.0005  -0.0023 *** 0.0005 
30 + experiences -0.0053 *** 0.0009  -0.0052 *** 0.0009 
S-T Ratio 0.0010 ** 0.0003  0.0010 ** 0.0003 
Minority Student Rate 0.0527  0.0599  0.0551  0.0604 
FRL Student Rate -0.0435  0.0497  -0.0461  0.0497 
#Enrollment 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Unemployment Rate -0.0006  0.0032  -0.0005  0.0032 
Year 2004:School Type (Charter) 0.0400  0.0429  0.0399  0.0429 
Year 2005:School Type (Charter) 0.0531  0.0416  0.0530  0.0417 
Year 2006:School Type (Charter) 0.0179  0.0434  0.0187  0.0435 
Year 2007:School Type (Charter) 0.0302  0.0392  0.0326  0.0393 
Year 2008:School Type (Charter) 0.0501  0.0419  0.0477  0.0418 
Year 2009:School Type (Charter) 0.1018 * 0.0430  0.0977 * 0.0431 
Year 2010:School Type (Charter) 0.0957 * 0.0431  0.0994 * 0.0439 
Q Comp 0.0085  0.0050     
Q Comp: School Type (Charter: 1) -0.0007  0.0340     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0116 * 0.0057 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0070  0.0069 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0053  0.0072 
4 Years Q Comp     0.0029  0.0086 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0538 *** 0.0149 
1 Year Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.0223  0.0458 
2 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     0.0120  0.0387 
3 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     0.0608  0.0597 
4 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.0466  0.0568 
5 Years Q Comp: School Type (Charter)     -0.0923  0.0600 
         
R
2
 0.0255    0.0269   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 120.1686, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 114.9359, p < 0.01) for 
the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-West method using the coeftest 
function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the lmtest package of R. 
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Thirdly, even when the duration of the Q Comp implementation was considered, 
the Q Comp effect specific in charter schools was not significant. This result is different 
from the pattern in overall teacher retention rate seen in Table IV-5, where charter 
schools that implemented Q Comp for five years had significantly different retention 
rates from the other schools. 
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CHAPTER V: EFFECT ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
This chapter reports the findings from the analyses of the student achievement 
model. The student achievement model used two kinds of test results to represent the 
level of student achievement of school: reading and mathematics of the Minnesota 
Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) for third graders. The results of analyses in this 
chapter provided answers to research question (3), the Q Comp effect on student 
achievement of schools, and (4c), the Q Comp effect on student achievement of schools 
that is distinctive in charter schools. 
Students’ Reading Achievement of Minnesota Schools 
The reading achievement analysis includes 6,800 cases, which consist of 990 
schools for eight years, from 2003 to 2010.
5 
This study focused on the third graders’ 
reading achievement so that the number of schools included in the analyses decreased 
significantly compared to the teacher retention model analyses. For the research period, 
the annual average of schools in the portion of students at or above the proficiency level 
on the MCA reading test fluctuated around 0.76, and after 2006 when it marked the top 
proficiency portion of 0.80, it decreased in 2010 to 0.75 (See Table V-1). After 
transforming the raw data to the school mean deviation scores, the means and standard 
deviations were reduced. The trend pattern, however, was the same. 
                                                 
 
5
 Minnesota Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) test has been generally taken in April. Therefore, this 
study assumed that a MCA result in a given year reflects the students’ learning from the fall of the previous 
year to spring of the given year. For example, 2003 MCA result reflected the students’ learning for 2002-03 
school year and 2010 MCA result did for 2009-10 school year. 
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< Table V- 1 > Trend in Third Grade Reading Achievement of Minnesota Public 
Schools: 2003–2010 
   (a) Student proficiency rates  
(b) School-Mean-Deviation 
Student proficiency rates 
Year N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
2003 851  0.75 0.16  -0.01 0.08 
2004 863  0.72 0.16  -0.04 0.08 
2005 856  0.76 0.15  0.00 0.08 
2006 836  0.80 0.14  0.03 0.07 
2007 851  0.78 0.15  0.02 0.07 
2008 853  0.77 0.17  0.01 0.07 
2009 848  0.77 0.16  0.01 0.07 
2010 842  0.75 0.17  -0.02 0.08 
 
Even though the transformation into school mean deviation scores did not change 
the trend of annual means, the transformation influenced the distribution of variables and 
correlations among them. The distribution of the percentage of proficient students across 
cases was different from the normal distribution and was negatively skewed (See Figure 
VI-1 (a)). Changing the dependent variable into school-mean deviation scores made the 
distribution look like a normal distribution (See Figure V-1(b) and 2(c)). As seen in the 
quantile-quantile plot (Q-Q plot, see Figure V-1(d)), however, the distribution was heavy-
tailed, as in the retention rate model. Because this analysis employed a large sample (N = 
6,800), this violation was not very problematic (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008).
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(a) Student Proficiency Rate in 3rd Grade 
Reading of MN Public Schools 
(b) Student Proficiency Rate in 3rd Grade 
Reading of MN Public Schools 
(School-Mean-Deviated) 
  
(c) Density Plot for Student Proficiency 
Rate in 3rd Grade Reading of MN 
Public Schools (School-Mean-
Deviated) 
(d) Q-Q Plot for Student Proficiency Rate 
in 3rd Grade Reading of MN Public 
Schools (School-Mean-Deviated) 
Note. Figures were generated by the sm package (Bowman & Azzalini, 2014) and the 
car package (Fox et al., 2014) in the software R 
 
 [ Figure V- 1 ] Distribution of Student Proficiency Rate in Third Grade Reading of 
Minnesota Public Schools 
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Correlation Analysis 
This study performed a correlation analysis for the variables considered (See 
Table V-2(A)). The dependent variable, school’s percentage of students who were at or 
above the proficiency level on the MCA reading test (student proficiency rate), was 
significantly correlated with the characteristics of school. That is, it was positively 
correlated with the student-teacher ratio (R= 0.05, p < 0.01) and negatively correlated 
with the percentage of minority students (R= -0.72, p < 0.01) and percentage of FRL 
students (R= -0.70, p < 0.01). As mentioned in Chapter 5, Minnesota schools’ student-
teacher ratio is negatively correlated with percentage of minority (not significantly, R= -
0.02, p > 0.10) and FRL students (significantly, R= -0.12, p < 0.01). That could be a 
reason for the positive correlation between the student-teacher ratio and the student 
proficiency rates. 
Minnesota charter schools had lower rates of student proficiency than traditional 
public schools (R= -0.25, p < 0.01), as is known in the literature. Minnesota charter 
schools also had a relatively higher percentage of minority and FRL students, which is 
consistent with the results of Chapter 4. 
The Q Comp implementation was also positively correlated with the student 
proficiency rates (R= 0.03, p < 0.01). It was also associated with the percentage of 
minority students (R = 0.08, p < 0.01) and FRL students (R= -0.06, p < 0.01), which was 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable as well. Therefore, multiple 
regression analyses were needed to examine the Q Comp effect on the student 
proficiency rates after controlling for those variables.  
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The Q Comp implementation was correlated with school type (R= 0.06, p < 0.01). 
It could be interpreted that Minnesota charter schools were more likely to adopt Q Comp, 
which is consistent with the results of Chapter 4.  
When this study considered the school fixed effects by transforming variables into 
school mean deviation scores, the correlation matrix changed (See Table V-2(B)). A 
decrease in the student-teacher ratio of a school was now correlated with an increase in 
the student proficiency rates, although it was a weak correlation (R= -0.04, p < 0.01). A 
decrease in the percentage of minority students showed a similar result (R= -0.07, p < 
0.01). A decrease in the percentage of FRL students, however, was not associated with a 
change in the dependent variable. School type is a time-invariant variable so it was 
impossible to use in the correlation analysis with school mean deviation scores, and that 
correlation is marked as “NA.” 
The implementation of Q Comp was still positively associated with the student 
proficiency rates after transforming the raw data into the school mean deviation score (R= 
0.04, p < 0.01). It was also correlated with the student-teacher ratio (R= 0.34, p < 0.01) 
and percentage of minority students (R= 0.26, p < 0.01), which was also negatively 
associated with the dependent variable (R= -0.04, p < 0.01 and R= -0.07, p < 0.01, 
respectively). In the next section, this study examined the effect of Q Comp after 
controlling for the time-variant school characteristics. 
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< Table V- 2 > Correlation Matrix of Variables in Third Grade Reading Achievement 
Analysis 
 
M
ea
n
 
S
D
 
S
tu
d
en
t 
p
ro
fi
ci
en
cy
 
ra
te
s 
 S
-T
 R
at
io
 
 M
in
o
ri
ty
 
S
tu
d
en
t 
R
at
e 
 F
R
L
 S
tu
d
en
t 
R
at
e 
 
S
ch
o
o
l 
T
y
p
e 
(C
h
ar
te
r:
 1
) 
 
 (A) Values before Transformation 
S-T Ratio 
16.00 12.17 0.05 **         
Minority 
Student Rate 
0.26 0.28 -0.72 ** -0.02        
FRL Student 
Rate 
0.39 0.24 -0.70 ** -0.12 ** 0.74 **     
School Type
+
 
(Charter) 
0.06 0.24 -0.25 ** 0.05 ** 0.27 ** 0.21 **   
Q Comp
+
 
 
0.12 0.32 0.03 ** 0.01  0.08 ** -0.06 ** 0.06 ** 
 
            
 (B) School Mean Deviation Values 
S-T Ratio 
0.00 9.96 -0.04 **         
Minority 
Student Rate 
0.00 0.04 -0.07 ** 0.61 **       
FRL Student 
Rate 
0.00 0.05 0.01  -0.04 ** -0.04 **     
School Type
++
 
(Charter) 
NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA    
Q Comp 
 
0.00 0.25 0.04 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** -0.01  NA  
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
Because school type and Q Comp (
+ 
marked) were nominal variables, point-
biserial correlation coefficients were calculated for them, which were calculated by 
biserial.cor function of the ltm package in R (Rizopoulos, 2013). 
Note 3.
  
School Type (
++ 
marked) was a time-invariant characteristic of school, so it was 
excluded from this correlation analysis. 
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Effect of Q Comp on Students’ Reading Achievement 
This study analyzed the students’ reading achievement model with consideration 
of school and year fixed effects (Table V-3). Firstly, the student proficiency rates of 
schools was negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of minority 
students (b = -0.1662, s.e. = 0.0403, t = -4.1273, p < 0.01) and the percentage of FRL 
students (b = -0.1640, s.e. = 0.0382, t = -4.2985, p < 0.01). That is, when the percentage 
of minority students increased by 10 percentage points, the student proficiency rates 
decreased by 1.662 percentage points. A 10 percentage points increase in the percentage 
of FRL students would be associated with a decrease of 1.640 percentage points in the 
student proficiency rates. These negative correlations are consistent with the previous 
studies that schools serving more disadvantaged students are more likely to show lower 
performance on student achievement (e.g., Roscigno, Tomaskovic-Devey, & Crowley, 
2006).  
Secondly, the Q Comp implementation was not significantly associated with 
student proficiency rates (b = 0.0085, s.e. = 0.0044, t = 1.9361, p > .05). When this study 
considered the length of time that schools implemented Q Comp, there was also no 
significant effect (Table V-3(B)).  
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< Table V- 3 > Result of Analysis on Student Achievement Model in Third Grade 
Reading 
 (A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
Year 2004 -0.0278  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
Year 2005 0.0213 ** 0.0403  -0.1662 ** 0.0405 
Year 2006 0.0534 ** 0.0382  -0.1638 ** 0.0382 
Year 2007 0.0418 ** 0.0038  -0.0278 ** 0.0038 
Year 2008 0.0385 ** 0.0039  0.0213 ** 0.0039 
Year 2009 0.0355 ** 0.0042  0.0534 ** 0.0043 
Year 2010 0.0189 ** 0.0044  0.0417 ** 0.0044 
S-T Ratio 0.0000 ** 0.0046  0.0385 ** 0.0046 
Minority Student Rate -0.1662 ** 0.0048  0.0358 ** 0.0048 
FRL Student Rate -0.1640 ** 0.0052  0.0188 ** 0.0053 
Q Comp 0.0085  0.0044     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0091  0.0053 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0089  0.0059 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0056  0.0065 
4 Years Q Comp     0.0110  0.0073 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0038  0.0175 
        
R
2
 0.0964    0.0965   
Adjusted R
2
 0.0822    0.0822       
F Statistic 56.2373 **   41.2467 **  
N (Unbalanced Panel) 6800    6800   
n 990    990   
T 1-8    1-8   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the 
pbgtest function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would 
present serial autocorrelation ( (1) = 22.3165, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) 
= 22.3998, p < 0.01) for the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-
West method using the coeftest function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the 
lmtest package of R. 
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Based on these results, this study failed to find a significant effect of Q Comp on 
student achievement in reading. At least, even for schools with five years of 
implementation, this study did not find a Q Comp effect on reading achievement after 
accounting for the other variables.  
Effect of Q Comp in Charter Schools 
In the next step, this study examined the distinctive effect of Q Comp on student 
achievement in charter schools, research question 4(c). The interaction effect terms of 
time and school type as well as Q Comp implementation and school type were added in 
the previous model to the examination (See Table V-4).  
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< Table V- 4 > Result of Analysis on Student Achievement Model in Third Grade 
Reading: Focusing on Charter Schools 
 
(A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
S-T Ratio 0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
Minority Student Rate -0.1582 ** 0.0404  -0.1568 ** 0.0405 
FRL Student Rate -0.1615 ** 0.0374  -0.1624 ** 0.0372 
Year 2004 -0.0276 ** 0.0038  -0.0276 ** 0.0038 
Year 2005 0.0209 ** 0.0038  0.0209 ** 0.0038 
Year 2006 0.0518 ** 0.0042  0.0518 ** 0.0042 
Year 2007 0.0386 ** 0.0042  0.0384 ** 0.0043 
Year 2008 0.0366 ** 0.0046  0.0367 ** 0.0046 
Year 2009 0.0330 ** 0.0047  0.0336 ** 0.0047 
Year 2010 0.0166 ** 0.0052  0.0163 ** 0.0053 
Year 2004:School Type (Charter) 0.0007  0.0288  0.0008  0.0288 
Year 2005:School Type (Charter) 0.0171  0.0337  0.0172  0.0337 
Year 2006:School Type (Charter) 0.0445  0.0351  0.0458  0.0352 
Year 2007:School Type (Charter) 0.0712  0.0395  0.0746 . 0.0393 
Year 2008:School Type (Charter) 0.0505  0.0369  0.0491  0.0371 
Year 2009:School Type (Charter) 0.0569  0.0403  0.0522  0.0405 
Year 2010:School Type (Charter) 0.0529  0.0415  0.0524  0.0440 
Q Comp 0.0047  0.0043     
Q Comp: School Type 0.0350  0.0265     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0063  0.0053 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0054  0.0056 
3 Years Q Comp     -0.0006  0.0060 
4 Years Q Comp     0.0069  0.0074 
5 Years Q Comp     0.0082  0.0142 
1 Year Q Comp: School Type     0.0214  0.0259 
2 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.0344  0.0370 
3 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.0762  0.0398 
4 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.0492  0.0415 
5 Years Q Comp: School Type     -0.0361  0.1095 
        
(continued)
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(continued) 
R
2
 0.1031    0.1041   
Adjusted R
2
 0.0878    0.0885   
F Statistic 35.034 **   24.8889 **  
N (Unbalanced Panel) 6800    6800   
n 990    990   
T 1-8    1-8   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the 
pbgtest function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would 
present serial autocorrelation ( (1) = 22.3165, p < 0.01 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 
22.3998, p < 0.01) for the Model (B)). All standard errors were corrected by Newey-
West method using the coeftest function with vcovHC and method=”arellano” in the 
lmtest package of R. 
Note 3. Even though the all interaction terms between year and school type (Year 
2004:School type ~ Year 2010: School Type) were not significant, when this study did 
not consider these interaction terms, the R
2 
was decreased to 0.1004 and the two models 
were significantly different (F(7, 5783) = 3.4275, p < 0.01). Therefore, this study 
reported the presented model rather than the reduced model. Interestingly, in the 
reduced model, the coefficient of 3 Years Q Comp: School Type was significant, which 
is consistent with the math model, as described in the next section of this chapter.  
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Firstly, Minnesota schools had higher rates of student achievement in the latter 
years of the analysis compared to the 2002–03 or 2003–04 school years. For example, the 
student proficiency  rate on the 2006 MCA reading test was 5.18 percentage points higher 
than in 2003 (b= 0.0518, s.e. = 0.0042, t = 12.2956, p < 0.01). 
Secondly, in addition to the general improvement in student achievement over 
time, Minnesota charter schools did not show significant differences compared to the 
other schools. Even though all the coefficients were positive, they were not significant. 
Third, Q Comp implementation was not significantly associated with student 
proficiency rates of schools (b= 0.0047, s.e. = 0.0043, t = 1.1076, p > 0.10). When the 
length of implementation was considered, this study did not find any evidence of a 
significant effect of Q Comp on student proficiency rates (e.g., in third implementation 
year, b= -0.0006, s.e. = 0.0060, t = -0.1042, p > 0.10). 
Fourthly, as with traditional schools, charter schools did not enjoy a positive 
effect of Q Comp on their student proficiency rates (in Table V-4(A), b= 0.0350, s.e. = 
0.0265, t = 1.3207, p > 0.10).  
Students’ Math Achievement of Minnesota Schools 
The math achievement analysis includes 6,783 cases, which consist of 985 
schools for eight years, from 2003 to 2010. For the research period, the annual average 
school rate in the portion of students at or above the proficiency level on the MCA math 
test fluctuated from 0.69 in 2004 to 0.81 in 2010 (See Table V-5(A)). After transforming 
the raw data to the school mean deviation scores, the means and standard deviations were 
reduced. The trend pattern, however, was the same (See Table V-5(B)). 
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< Table V- 5 > Trend in Third Grade Math Achievement of Minnesota Public Schools: 
2003–2010 
   (a) Student Proficiency Rate  
(b) School-Mean-Deviation 
Student Proficiency Rate 
Year N  Mean SD  Mean SD 
2003 856  0.73 0.16  -0.03 0.08 
2004 862  0.69 0.17  -0.07 0.09 
2005 857  0.75 0.16  -0.01 0.08 
2006 842  0.76 0.16  0.00 0.08 
2007 845  0.77 0.15  0.00 0.08 
2008 846  0.79 0.15  0.03 0.08 
2009 838  0.80 0.15  0.03 0.08 
2010 837  0.81 0.15  0.04 0.08 
 
The distribution of the student proficiency rate across cases was different from the 
normal distribution and was negatively skewed (See Figure VI-1 (a)). Changing the 
dependent variable into school-mean deviation scores made the distribution look like a 
normal distribution (See Figure VI-1(b) and 2(c)). As seen in the quantile-quantile plot 
(Q-Q plot, see Figure V-1(d)), however, the distribution was heavy-tailed, as it was in the 
retention rate model and in the reading achievement model. In spite of the violation of the 
normality assumption, the large sample size of this analysis (N = 6,774) mitigates this 
threat to validity (Gujarati & Sangeetha, 2008). 
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(a) Student Proficiency Rate in 3rd Grade 
Math of MN Public Schools 
(b) Student Proficiency Rate in 3rd Grade 
Math of MN Public Schools (School-
Mean-Deviated) 
  
  
(c) Density Plot for Student Proficiency 
Rate in 3rd Grade Math of MN Public 
Schools (School-Mean-Deviated)  
(d) Q-Q Plot for Student Proficiency Rate 
in 3rd Grade Math of MN Public 
Schools  (School-Mean-Deviated) 
Note. Figures were generated by the sm package (Bowman & Azzalini, 2014) and the 
car package (Fox et al., 2014) in the software R 
 
 [ Figure V- 2 ] Distribution of Student Proficiency Rate in Third Grade Math of 
Minnesota Public Schools 
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Correlation Analysis 
Correlations among variables (see Table V-6) look similar to the results of the 
reading achievement analysis described in Table V-2. The Q Comp implementation was 
also positively correlated with the student proficiency rates (R= 0.11, p < 0.01). While it 
was  weakly correlated, the association was larger than the correlation of the Q Comp 
implementation and the student proficiency rates in reading. 
Q Comp implementation was correlated with school type (R= 0.05, p < 0.01). It 
could be interpreted that Minnesota charter schools were more likely to adopt Q Comp, 
which is consistent with the results of the reading analysis.  
When this study considered the school fixed effects by transforming variables into 
school mean deviation scores, the implementation of Q Comp was still positively 
associated with the student proficiency rates (R= 0.15, p < 0.01). It was also correlated 
with the student-teacher ratio (R= 0.34, p < 0.01) and percentage of minority students (R= 
0.26, p < 0.01). 
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< Table V- 6 > Correlation Matrix of Variables in Third Grade Math Achievement 
Analysis 
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 (A) Values before Transformation 
S-T Ratio 16.01 12.19 0.03 *         
Minority 
Student Rate 
0.25 0.28 -0.62 ** -0.01        
FRL Student 
Rate 
0.39 0.24 -0.63 ** -0.12 ** 0.74 **     
School Type
+
 
(Charter) 
0.06 0.24 -0.26 ** 0.05 ** 0.25 ** 0.19 **   
Q Comp
+
 
 
0.12 0.32 0.11 ** 0.01  0.07 ** -0.06 ** 0.05 ** 
 
            
 (B) School Mean Deviation Values 
S-T Ratio 0.00 9.95 0.00          
Minority 
Student Rate 
0.00 0.04 0.13 ** -0.04 **       
FRL Student 
Rate 
0.00 0.05 0.09 ** 0.60 ** -0.04 **     
School Type
++
 
(Charter) 
NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA    
Q Comp 
 
0.00 0.24 0.15 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** -0.01  NA  
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. This correlation matrix was developed by the psych package in R (Revelle, 2014). 
Note 2.
  
Because school type and Q Comp (
+ 
marked) were nominal variables, point-
biserial correlation coefficients were calculated for them, which were calculated by 
biserial.cor function of the ltm package in R (Rizopoulos, 2013). 
Note 3.
  
School Type (
++ 
marked) was a time-invariant characteristic of school so it was 
excluded from this correlation analysis. 
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Effect of Q Comp on Students’ Math Achievement 
This study analyzed the students’ math achievement model with consideration of 
school and year fixed effects (Table V-7). The result looks similar to the reading 
achievement analysis. Firstly, the student mathematics proficiency rate of schools was 
negatively and significantly associated with the percentage of FRL students (b = -0.1954, 
s.e. = 0.0290, t = -6.7419, p < 0.01). Math proficiency, however, was not significantly 
correlated with the percentage of minority students (b = -0.0636, s.e. = 0.0359, t = -
1.7716, p > 0.05), which is different from the result of  the reading achievement analysis.  
Secondly, the Q Comp implementation was not associated with student 
proficiency rates (b = 0.0072, s.e. = 0.0049, t = 1.4739, p > .10). When this study 
considered the length of time that Q Comp was implemented, there was also no 
significant effect (Table V-3(B)). The result is similar to the results of the reading 
achievement analysis. 
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< Table V- 7 > Result of Analysis on Student Achievement Model in Third Grade 
Mathematics 
 
(A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
S-T Ratio 0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
Minority Student Rate -0.0636  0.0359  -0.0610  0.0360 
FRL Student Rate -0.1954 ** 0.0290  -0.1955 ** 0.0290 
Year 2004 -0.0377 ** 0.0043  -0.0377 ** 0.0043 
Year 2005 0.0301 ** 0.0044  0.0300 ** 0.0044 
Year 2006 0.0396 ** 0.0045  0.0395 ** 0.0045 
Year 2007 0.0454 ** 0.0046  0.0451 ** 0.0047 
Year 2008 0.0736 ** 0.0047  0.0733 ** 0.0048 
Year 2009 0.0827 ** 0.0049  0.0823 ** 0.0049 
Year 2010 0.0979 ** 0.0051  0.0989 ** 0.0052 
Q Comp 0.0072  0.0049     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0085  0.0069 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0074  0.0070 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0111  0.0079 
4 Years Q Comp     -0.0007  0.0091 
5 Years Q Comp     -0.0029  0.0198 
        
R
2
 0.1730    0.1733   
Adjusted R
2
 0.1476    0.1477   
F Statistic 109.9040 **   80.6666 **  
N (Unbalanced Panel) 6774    6774   
n 985    985   
T 1-8    1-8   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R 
(Croissant et al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would not present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 0.4811, p > 0.10 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 0.5142, p < 0.01) for the 
Model (B)). All standard errors were not corrected by Newey-West method. 
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Effect of Q Comp in Charter Schools 
In the next step, this study considered the distinctive effect of Q Comp on 
students’ math achievement in charter schools, research question 4(c). The interaction 
effect terms of time and school type as well as Q Comp implementation and school type 
were added to the examination in the previous model (See Table V-8).  
Firstly, in the later years of analysis, Minnesota schools had higher rates of 
student proficiency in 3rd grade math achievement compared to 2002–03, except for the 
2003–04 school year. On average, other things being equal, Minnesota charter schools 
had higher math proficiency rates in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 than charter schools in 
2003; that is b= 0.0637, s.e. = 0.0217, t = 2.9378, p < 0.01 in 2006-07; b= 0.0687, s.e. = 
0.0215, t = 3.1910, p < 0.01 in 2007-08; b= 0.0886, s.e. = 0.0220, t = 4.0286, p < 0.01 in 
2008-09; and b= 0.0780, s.e. = 0.0222, t = 3.5164, p < 0.01 in 2009-10.  
Second, the Q Comp implementation was not significantly associated with the 
student proficiency rates of traditional schools (in Table V-8(A), b= 0.0016, s.e. = 
0.0051, t = 0.311, p > 0.10). When the length of implementation was considered, this 
study did not find any evidence of a significant effect of Q Comp on student proficiency 
rates (e.g., for schools with three years of Q Comp implementation, b= 0.0025, s.e. = 
0.0081, t = 0.3093, p > 0.10 in Table V-8(B)). This result is consistent with the results 
from the reading achievement analysis. 
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< Table V- 8 > Result of Analysis on Student Achievement Model in Third Grade 
Mathematics: Focusing on Charter Schools 
 
(A) Q Comp - Binary  (B) Q Comp - Period 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
Year 2004 -0.0365 ** 0.0043  -0.0366 ** 0.0043 
Year 2005 0.0304 ** 0.0044  0.0303 ** 0.0044 
Year 2006 0.0385 ** 0.0045  0.0382 ** 0.0045 
Year 2007 0.0427 ** 0.0047  0.0422 ** 0.0047 
Year 2008 0.0708 ** 0.0048  0.0704 ** 0.0049 
Year 2009 0.0783 ** 0.0049  0.0782 ** 0.0050 
Year 2010 0.0939 ** 0.0052  0.0947 ** 0.0053 
S-T Ratio 0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
Minority Student Rate -0.0457  0.0358  -0.0410  0.0360 
FRL Student Rate -0.1925 ** 0.0289  -0.1937 ** 0.0289 
Year 2004:School Type (Charter) -0.0247  0.0214  -0.0245  0.0214 
Year 2005:School Type (Charter) 0.0001  0.0212  0.0004  0.0212 
Year 2006:School Type (Charter) 0.0360  0.0213  0.0373  0.0213 
Year 2007:School Type (Charter) 0.0637 ** 0.0217  0.0674 ** 0.0219 
Year 2008:School Type (Charter) 0.0687 ** 0.0215  0.0675 ** 0.0216 
Year 2009:School Type (Charter) 0.0886 *** 0.0220  0.0845 ** 0.0222 
Year 2010:School Type (Charter) 0.0780 *** 0.0222  0.0814 ** 0.0229 
Q Comp (Q Comp) 0.0016  0.0051     
Q Comp: School Type 0.0493 * 0.0197     
1 Year Q Comp     0.0041  0.0071 
2 Years Q Comp     0.0019  0.0073 
3 Years Q Comp     0.0025  0.0081 
4 Years Q Comp     -0.0060  0.0094 
5 Years Q Comp     -0.0010  0.0210 
1 Year Q Comp: School Type     0.0373  0.0250 
2 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.0440  0.0259 
3 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.1030 ** 0.0321 
4 Years Q Comp: School Type     0.0442  0.0355 
5 Years Q Comp: School Type     -0.0368  0.0623 
        
R
2
 0.1850    0.1862   
Adjusted R
2
 0.1576    0.1584   
F Statistic 68.9156 **   48.8319 **  
N (Unbalanced Panel) 6774    6774   
n 985    985   
T 1-8    1-8   
* p < .05; ** p< .01 
Note 1. Models (A) and (B) were analyzed by the plm function in the plm package of R (Croissant et 
al., 2013). 
Note 2. In the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test on the result of the analysis, using the pbgtest 
function in the plm package of R (Croissant et al., 2013), result that there would not present serial 
autocorrelation ( (1) = 0.1932, p > 0.10 for the Model (A) and ( (1) = 0.2, p < 0.01) for the 
Model (B)). All standard errors were not corrected by Newey-West method. 
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Thirdly, in contrast to the other schools, on average, charter schools that 
implemented Q Comp enjoyed a positive effect of Q Comp on their student proficiency 
rates (in Table V-8(A), b= 0.0493, s.e. = 0.0197, t = 2.4999, p < 0.05). Charter schools 
that implemented Q Comp for three years had proficiency rates that were 10.3 percentage 
points higher than other schools in the (in Table V-8(B), b= 0.1030, s.e. = 0.0321, t = 
3.2123, p < 0.01). This finding is different from the results of the reading analysis where 
the difference between charter schools that implemented Q Comp for three years and the 
other schools was not significant (b= 0.0762, s.e. = 0.0398, t = 1.9141, p = 0.0557 > 
0.05).  
Fourthly, the charter school specific effect of Q Comp in schools with 3 years of 
Q Comp implementation was not found in schools with different years of implementation 
of Q Comp. The coefficients were not significant for different years of implementation; 
note also that the size of the coefficient decreased as the duration of implementation 
increased (b= 0.0442, s.e. = 0.0355, t = 1.2453, p > 0.10 in schools with 4 years of Q 
Comp and b= -0.0368, s.e. = 0.0623, t = -0.5913, p > 0.10 in schools with 5 years of Q 
Comp).  
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Conclusion 
This study analyzed the association of alternative teacher compensation programs 
with teacher retention rates and student achievement in the case of the Minnesota Quality 
Compensation program. The analyses provided important answers for the research 
questions raised. The results are summarized in the following paragraphs and a fuller 
discussion that includes policy implications is discussed in subsequent sections. 
First, the results of the analysis indicate that alternative teacher compensation 
programs had effects on schools’ overall retention rates of teachers. The analysis 
indicates, however, that it took at least five years for significant effects to appear. 
Consistent with the previous studies mentioned in Table II-1, the effect of Q Comp was 
not significant even after four years of implementation. This study found a positive effect 
of Q Comp in schools with 5 years of implementation, which previous studies had not 
examined. Thus, policymakers and educators would have to be prepared to give ACPs 
sufficient time to work before making summative decisions on their effectiveness.  
Second, alternative teacher compensation programs had an effect on schools’ 
retention rates of experienced teachers. It also took at least five years for this effect to be 
visible, however.  
Third, alternative teacher compensation programs had no significant effect on 
overall student achievement as measured by third-grade proficiency rates in reading and 
mathematics. However, there were significant findings for charter schools; these findings 
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are described below. Overall, even after 5 years of implementing Q Comp, there was no 
considerable difference in student proficiency rates. While the student body changed over 
that time, the rhetoric associated with the policy suggested that it should have a 
systematic positive effect. The findings do not support that assumption. 
Fourth, aside from the general effect, charter schools that implemented Q Comp 
typically had lower overall teacher retention rates. These significantly lower rates were 
apparent in schools that had implemented Q Comp for 5 years.  
Fifth, while ACPs were associated with lower overall teacher retention rates in 
charter schools, there was no distinctive effect for charter schools of alternative teacher 
compensation programs on schools’ retention rates of experienced teachers.  
Sixth, charter schools that implemented Q Comp had significantly different rates 
of proficiency from other schools; traditional schools that implemented Q Comp did not 
have significantly different proficiency rates from other schools. The charter-specific 
effect peaked in schools with 3 years of implementation in reading as well as in math, but 
was statistically significant only for math.  
Discussion 
Reviewing the previous studies on ACPs, this study saw the need to examine 
alternate compensation programs that have been in place over a relatively long period. In 
addition, this study hypothesized the possibility of ACPs’ distinctive effect across school 
types. The findings of this study showed the significance of considering long-term effects 
and school-type-specific effects. On the other hand, the findings of this study raised 
additional questions, which I discuss below. 
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Time is Needed for ACPs to Bear Fruit 
Most reforms need some amount of time to realize their effect (Fullan, 2007). 
This is true for ACPs. The sizes of coefficients, regardless of the significance, were large 
in schools with 1 year of implementation and then typically decreased for schools with 2, 
3, or 4 years of implementation. However, in schools with 5 years of implementation the 
coefficient was positive and significant. Recall the Texas GEEG study (Springer, Lewis, 
Podgursky, Ehlert, Taylor, et al., 2009) that found a significant effect only in the first 
implementation year. Considering the results of the Texas study and this study, the first 
year would be special in the short-term implementation even though it was not significant 
in this study. There may be higher expectations for the new program in the first 
implementation year. After the initial year, however, the novelty would disappear and 
struggles to develop “a shared meaning of the new program in school” (Fullan, 2007) 
would begin. As a result, it would be difficult to discover significant effects of ACPs in 
the early years (years 2-4) of implementation once the novelty wore off from the initial 
year. These conclusions are consistent with the results of this study and previous studies. 
After developing the shared meaning, however, schools could reap the benefit of the new 
program, and this study found some significant effect of Q Comp after five years of 
implementation.  
Regarding teacher retention rates, there was no significant effect of Q Comp 
except for schools with 5 years of implementation. Therefore, if this study used samples 
with shorter terms of ACP implementation, it might have failed to find significant effects. 
As with many other reform efforts (e.g., Sass, 2006, found that new charter schools take 
five years of operation to catch up or exceed traditional schools in student achievement), 
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it seems that ACPs also needed at least five years of implementation to realize the effect 
of change. However, we are unable to tell if this effect would be sustained in schools with 
six or more years of implementation. 
This study did not find evidence of ACPs’ effect on student achievement, which 
may be an indication that it might take more time for the effect of ACPs on student 
achievement to be realized. According to a theoretical argument, ACPs’ effect on teacher 
retention, especially on the retention of teachers with certain characteristics associated 
with student achievement, could strengthen the teaching force of schools. This 
enhancement could eventually lead to an improvement in student achievement (Lazear, 
2003). Based on this logic, the findings of this study regarding teacher retention could be 
a signal of future improvements in student achievement for the schools included in this 
analysis. 
Sustainability of the Effect 
This study found evidence that at least five years would be needed to see the 
effect of ACPs on teacher retention rates. However, there was no answer for the question 
of sustainability, which is a limitation of this study. The question of sustainability is 
particularly relevant for the findings regarding student achievement; the effect of Q 
Comp on students’ math achievement appeared in schools with 3 years of implementation 
but was not found in schools with more years of implementation. These findings led to 
questions on the sustainability of the ACPs, which is an important issue for policymakers 
to consider when making decisions as to whether the program will be continued or 
stopped. 
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In addition, an important corollary would be what characteristics of schools are 
associated with the sustainability of ACPs. This study did not focus on this question. 
Considering the low values of R-squared for the analyses (from 0.0124 to 0.0269 in the 
retention rate model and from 0.0964 to 0.1862 in the student achievement model), there 
are likely more variables associated with variations in the dependent variables that were 
not included in this study. More studies are needed to determine which school 
characteristics are associated with the dependent variables and which variables mediated 
the association between the dependent variables and ACPs. For example, leadership 
succession would be a good candidate for pursuing that question (Hargreaves & 
Goodson, 2006). Given the strong relationships between leadership and teacher retention 
and between leadership and student achievement (Boyd et al., 2011; Louis, Dretzke, & 
Wahlstrom, 2010), leadership succession would mediate the association between teacher 
retention and ACPs and between student achievement and ACPs, which could be a future 
avenue of research. 
Dilemma in Charter Schools: Relationship Between Teacher Retention Rate and 
Student Achievement 
Even though many significant effects of Q Comp were found in this study, the 
two effects on teacher retention rate and student achievement do not seem to be related 
with each other. In other words, Q Comp had a positive and significant association with 
teacher retention rates in traditional schools, but this association was not significant for 
student achievement in traditional schools. Moreover, in charter schools, Q Comp 
showed a relatively negative effect on overall teacher retention rates but a relatively 
   126 
positive effect on students’ math achievement. The positive and negative effects would 
put charter school policymakers into a dilemma regarding Q Comp implementation: Do 
they adopt Q Comp for student achievement at the risk of decreasing teacher retention 
rate? Considering the relationship between decrease in teacher retention rate and lower 
student achievement (Carruthers, 2012; Stuit & Smith, 2012), can we say that the risk of 
decreasing teacher retention rate in Q Comp charter schools would not result in a 
decrease in student achievement in the near future? 
As a way to address this question, let’s remember that the retention rate of 
teachers with certain characteristics associated with student achievement would be more 
important than the retention rate of overall teachers in terms of student achievement 
(Lazear, 2003). This leads us to a result of this study that the retention rate of experienced 
teachers was not decreased in the midst of the decrease in the retention rate of teachers 
overall in charter schools with 5 years of Q Comp implementation. That the retention rate 
of experienced teachers in charter schools with Q Comp was not decreased could be 
interpreted as an indication that the ability of charter schools with Q Comp to retain 
teachers with certain characteristics associated with higher student achievement was not 
decreased. If the charter schools with Q Comp could fill the vacant positions with 
teachers who had certain characteristics associated with higher student achievement, the 
teaching force of the charter schools would be improved, and the improved teaching force 
would be positive for improving student achievement in future. Therefore, to answer the 
dilemma presented above, an additional investigation on teacher recruitment of charter 
schools with Q Comp will be needed in a future study. 
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Teacher Retention in Charter School 
This study found that Minnesota charter schools have seen improved rates of 
teacher retention from 2003 to 2010 compared to traditional public schools. One possible 
explanation for this pattern could be the relationship of the increase in teacher retention 
rates in charter schools with the highly qualified teacher initiative under the No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB). Moreover, this study defined the teacher retention rate by 
focusing on teachers who taught academic core subjects, which was the target group of 
the policy. That is, the NCLB required schools to assign highly qualified teachers, mostly 
defined by their major in college and formal certification (U.S. Department of Education, 
2004), to academic core subjects. The act made it more important for schools to retain 
their highly qualified teachers. Charter schools that have been reported to have a 
relatively lower retention rate of teachers (Carruthers, 2012; Cowen & Winters, 2012; 
Stuit & Smith, 2012) might have exerted more effort to retain their highly qualified 
teachers in the core subjects to meet the requirement of the law. As a result, charter 
schools in Minnesota would show improvement in their teacher retention rate during the 
research period as a result of factors other than implementation of ACPs. If this were 
true, the NCLB policy would be effective in improving the teacher retention rate in 
charter schools. Even though this issue was not a primary focus of this study, it would be 
helpful if more studies examined the effect of NCLB policy on teacher retention rates. 
Limitations of This Study 
Despite attempting to produce unbiased estimates as much as possible, this study 
still involved a possibility of biased estimation on the Q Comp coefficient because it 
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included non-Q Comp schools, as stated in Chapter III. This study provides more 
information on the possibility of biased estimation in the Appendix. Even though 
inclusion of non-Q Comp schools made this study control for year fixed effects on 
dependent variables, this inclusion also presented the possibility of biased estimation, 
which should be considered in the interpretation of results in this study. 
Another limitation of this study is that it focused on teacher retention rate and 
student achievement as outcomes of ACPs, which is a narrow view of the effectiveness of 
ACPs. Even though teacher retention rate and student achievement would be important 
outcomes of ACPs, more comprehensive understanding of ACPs on various school 
outcomes will be needed to evaluate and improve this new program. For example, a 
qualitative study reported that Q Comp might improve communication between teachers 
and administrators as well as increase teachers’ workloads (Wahlstrom et al., 2006). The 
same study also found that students in schools with Q Comp felt unwanted pressure that 
“they could feel for having an effect upon their teachers’ salaries” (Wahlstrom et al., 
2006, p. 14). Moreover, considering concerns that emphasizing extrinsic motivation 
could decrease intrinsic motivation, which would affect long-term performance of an 
organization (Osterloh & Frey, 2002), intrinsic motivation of teachers under ACPs should 
be given attention. When we consider studies on various effects of ACPs together with 
this study, we can develop a comprehensive understanding of ACPs. 
It is also a limitation of this study not to consider variation in design of ACPs. 
Because ACPs are generally permitted to design their own programs for schools within 
some requirements, implementation of ACPs would vary across characteristics of design 
(Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, 2009; Wahlstrom et al., 2006). Because of 
   129 
data limitations and an interest in the average Q Comp effect, this study did not consider 
differences in design. The different design characteristics of ACPs, however, are an 
important issue to investigate in future studies. 
Finally, it should be stated that the models used in this study showed very low R
2
, 
which suggests that this model would explain only a little of the within-school variation 
of teacher retention rate and student achievement of schools. The low R
2
 could be related 
to considerations of school fixed effects. Let’s remember the result of the correlation 
analyses among variables before and after transforming mean-deviation scores. Before 
transformation to mean-deviation scores—that is, before the consideration of school fixed 
effects—correlations of teacher retention with school characteristics including percentage 
of minority students, percentage of FRL students, student–teacher ratio, and the number 
of students enrolled were significant. Those characteristics can show well the difference 
in working conditions related with teacher retention within and between schools. After 
consideration of school fixed effects, however, the correlations became weaker or 
insignificant. After removing between-school variance and focusing on within-school 
variance, these characteristics became limited to represent the differences in working 
conditions. This implies that changes of characteristics in student groups of schools, 
student-teacher ratio, and number of students would only capture a limited number of 
characteristics of schools associated with changes in teacher retention rates or student 
achievement. In the future, it is important to include variables to explain within-school 
changes of teacher retention rates or student achievement. As mentioned above, including 
characteristics on ACP design would be a promising approach to explain within-school 
changes of ACP schools. 
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Contributions of This Study 
Even though it has limitations, this study contributes to the discourse and 
understanding of alternative compensation programs by examining Minnesota Q Comp. 
Firstly, by using longitudinal data, this study investigated relatively long-term program 
effects. This research period includes 5 years of implementation of ACPs, which made it 
possible to find a long-term effect of ACPs. Findings on the effect of Q Comp on teacher 
retention rate for schools that implemented this program for 5 years proved the usefulness 
of a long-term investigation. 
Secondly, this study found that the effect of ACPs could differ by school type. 
Even though this study did not find evidence on continuing effects of ACPs in charter 
schools, there were significant effects of Q Comp on students’ math achievement 
compared to traditional schools. This implies that ACPs as a voluntary program might be 
more attractive for charter schools, not only for receiving more resources but also for 
improving student achievement. If it is possible to sustain Q Comp effects in charter 
schools, ACPs could be a useful way to improve these organizations.   
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Appendix. Discussion on Biasedness of Q Comp Effects Estimation 
This study compared school cases between pre- and post-Q Comp implementation 
to estimate the difference related with Q Comp implementation. This study also 
considered differences related with year by including schools which had never 
experienced Q Comp. The inclusion of those schools, however, would make Q Comp 
effects estimation biased. This issue was considered with examples in Table A1. 
In the left panels of the Table A1, this study assumed the real Q Comp effect was 
12. A school which had never implemented Q Comp (Non-QC) was included in the 
second column of the panel and the school had a value of 0 for the dependent variable for 
the four observed years. The other school which experienced Q Comp in 2005-06 and 
2006-07 school year (QC) was considered in the third column of the panel. It basically 
showed a value of 2 for the dependent variable, different from the Non-QC school. After 
Q Comp implementation in 2005-06 and 2006-07, the QC school had 14 as the value of 
the dependent variable because of the assumed Q Comp effect. Those were presented in 
Panel 1a in Table A1. 
Panel 1b in Table A1 showed the result of including school fixed effects by mean-
centering. Because the mean of Non-QC school was zero, the values of Non-QC school 
were not changed. Because the mean of the QC school was 8, however, the values of the 
QC school were decreased by 8. 
Panel 1c in Table A1 showed the result of mean comparison between with and 
without Q Comp implementation cases, which is the approach used in this study. The 
mean of cases with Q Comp (two white colored columns in Panel 1b) was 6. On the other 
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hand, the mean of cases without Q Comp (six gray colored columns in Panel 1b) was -2. 
Therefore, the estimated Q Comp effects would be 8 (6 - (-2) = 8), which was biased 
downwardly, that is, underestimated by 4 (12 - 8 = 4), compared to the assumed Q Comp 
effect of 12. 
 
< Table A1 > Comparison Estimated Effects between with and without Non Q Comp 
schools 
Panel 1a 
 
Panel 2a 
  Non-QC QC 
 
  Non-QC QC 
2003-04 0 2 
 
2003-04 0 0 
2004-05 0 2 
 
2004-05 0 0 
2005-06 0 14 
 
2005-06 0 24 
2006-07 0 14 
 
2006-07 0 24 
mean 0 8 
 
mean 0 12 
       Panel 1b 
 
Panel 2b 
  Mean-Centered 
 
  Mean-Centered 
  Non-QC QC 
 
  Non-QC QC 
2003-04 0 -6 
 
2003-04 0 -12 
2004-05 0 -6 
 
2004-05 0 -12 
2005-06 0 6 
 
2005-06 0 12 
2006-07 0 6 
 
2006-07 0 12 
       Panel 1c (with Non-QC schools) 
 
Panel 2c (with Non-QC schools) 
mean|QC=0 -2   
 
mean|QC=0 -4   
mean|QC=1 
 
6 
 
mean|QC=1 
 
12 
δ=8 
 
  
 
δ=16 
 
  
Y= -2 + 8(QC)     
 
Y= -4 + 16(QC)     
       Panel 1d (without Non-QC schools) 
 
Panel 2d (without Non-QC schools) 
mean|QC=0 
 
-6 
 
mean|QC=0 
 
-12 
mean|QC=1 
 
6 
 
mean|QC=1 
 
12 
δ=12     
 
δ=24     
 Source. S. S. Yeh (personal communication, December 9, 2014).  
 
Panel 1d in Table A1 described the result of comparison without non-Q Comp 
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schools. . The mean of cases with Q Comp (two white colored columns in Panel 1b) was 
still 6. On the other hand, the mean of cases without Q Comp (two bold typed columns in 
Panel 1b) was -6, which was different from the Panel 1c. As a result, the estimated Q 
Comp effects would be 12 (6 - (-6) = 12), which was unbiased, compared to the assumed 
Q Comp effect of 12. 
Let’s consider one more example to see the relationship between the real effect 
size and the degree of biasedness. In the right panels of the Table A1, the real Q Comp 
effect was assumed to be 24, which is bigger than in the left panels. School fixed effects 
for both Non-QC and QC schools were zero. After the same processing with the left 
panels, this study estimated Q Comp effects to be 16 if we include Non-QC schools and 
24 if we exclude Non-QC schools. The method includingNon-QC schools again produced 
a biased estimate of Q Comp effect by 8 (24 – 16 = 8) and the degree of biasedness was 
bigger than in the left panels. 
Those examples lead to concerns that the estimated Q Comp effects would be 
biased in this study which included Non-QC schools. In spite of the concern, this study 
included Non-QC schools for three reasons. Firstly, as described in Chapter 3 of this 
study, the inclusion of Non-QC schools was necessary to consider for differences related 
with time. Secondly, the way of including Non-treatment objectives has been widely used 
in program effect evaluation studies (e.g., Bifulco, Cobb, & Bell, 2009). Thirdly, the 
statistical analysis seems to be processed in a way to exclude the possibility of biasedness 
in a simulation. To check the actual result of analysis in statistical software, I developed a 
simple data set based on the left panel of the Table A1 as below. 
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< Table A2 > Data for Simulating Q Comp Effect Estimation with Non Q Comp schools 
schid dv qcomp year 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 2 
1 0 0 3 
1 0 0 4 
4 2 0 1 
4 2 0 2 
4 14 1 3 
4 14 1 4 
 Source. Author developed based on the example of S. Yeh (personal communication, 
December 9, 2014), seen in the Table A1. 
 
With the data, this study did statistical analysis with the software R as described 
in Figure A1 with R syntax. The result showed that the statistical analysis produced 
unbiased estimates for the coefficient of Q Comp, 12 (see in the Step 3 in Figure A1). 
This result can be interpreted that the actual process of fixed effect model to estimate the 
coefficient would be different with the process shown in Table A1. This study, however, 
did not fully understand the process so it cannot exclude the possibility of the biased 
estimates described above. 
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[ Figure A1 ] Process of Data Analysis for Simulating Q Comp Effect Estimation in the 
Software R 
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In addition to the result of simulation, the inclusion of the non-Q Comp schools 
was necessary to consider changes in teacher retention rates or student proficiency rate 
related with time. The dependent variables could be changed by year. An example is 
changes in student proficiency rate associated with version change of the tests as 
discussed in Chapter III. Changes in teacher retention rate associated with economic 
conditions would be another example. Most of all, all schools in practice, regardless of 
whether or not they formally accepted Q Comp, tried to improve teacher retention rate 
and student achievement, which would lead annual changes. In a practical sense, 
excluding these schools from the analysis would accord more of the change to formal 
implementation of the Q-Comp program than would be warranted. Therefore, these 
annual differences would need to be addressed in the analysis by including non-Q Comp 
schools and controlling for year fixed effects even though the possibility of unbiased 
estimation from the inclusion of non-Q comp schools. 
 
